Internal Migration of Young People in Kazakhstan: case study of Almaty

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Abbreviations

ASU – Almaty State University after Abai
GRP – gross regional product
SFYPD – Almaty State Foundation for Youth Policy Development
SCPP – State Center for Pension Payment
KazNAU – Kazakh National Agrarian University
KIMEP – Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics, and Strategic Research
MoI – Ministry of Interior
IMF – International Monetary Foundation
ILO – International Labour Organization
MES – Ministry of Education and Science
MCI – minimal calculation index
SMB – small and medium business
MoA – Ministry of Agriculture
MoLSP – Ministry of Labor and Social Protection
NGO – non-governmental organization
UN – United Nations Organization
OECD – Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PVS – Passport and Visa Service
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VTF – vocational training facility
1. Introduction
Differing levels of economic development in Kazakhstan’s regions have become a major cause contributing to internal migration. In all regions there is a wide disparity of income and living conditions between more prosperous urban areas and poorer rural areas. Employment prospects for high school graduates in rural areas are particularly bleak. Both job shortages and underdeveloped social infrastructure in villages and small rural settlements drive internal migrants to seek a better living in the towns.1

As a hub for domestic and foreign investment, Almaty is the most popular destination for Kazakhstan’s internal migrants offering newcomers the promise of better opportunities and employment prospects.

However, job-seekers coming to Almaty from other areas of the country, often find it difficult to find housing and work legally. As a result many internal migrants take refuge in micro-districts on the outskirts of the city, where they are not officially registered, do not own property and have little access to quality services. The majority of them are part of the so called informal workforce.2

Studying and understanding internal migration is a prerequisite for implementing economic strategy and policy. Ongoing monitoring of migration flows and assessment of contributing factors will allow to address a host of socio-economic issues, including unemployment and shortage of available housing.

Although young people account for a large proportion of internal migrants, the problems they face remain outside of the government’s focus. The economic issues related to young people include employment, income, savings, spending, affordable higher education and healthcare. The social issues encompass cohabitation, marriage, divorce, fertility, gender equity, crime, and intergroup relations. The political issues concern trust and engagement in formal and informal political institutions.

Experts from the International Monetary Fund have written “youth have a huge stake in bringing about a political and economic system that heeds their aspirations, addresses their need for a decent standard of living, and offers them hope for the future. The absence of such a system is a potent recipe for conflict—especially now, with the availability of cheap means of communication such as smartphones and social media”.3

A targeted study of internal migration of young people to Almaty allows for a timely examination of these issues.

The project aims to provide a comprehensive study of the processes shaping the internal migration of young people to Almaty and identification of related social issues.

Project objectives include:
1. Analysis of government policies in the area of internal migration and youth policy, and an evaluation of the implementation of these policies.

1 M. Makhmutova. Analysis of needs and challenges of low-income population (internal migrants and repatriates) and recommendations on addressing these needs. Public Policy Research Center, 2008. Within the framework of the Council of Economic Consultants to the Government of Kazakhstan.
2 Ibid.
3 IMF, Finance & Development, March 2012
2. Analysis of internal migration statistics, review of data on internal migration of young people to Almaty.
3. A survey of 1,000 young people who moved to Almaty from other parts of the country.
4. Development of recommendations based on the results of the study.

Research methodology

Within the framework of this study the term ‘youth’ defines young people of between 14 - to 29 years. This age bracket was chosen to accommodate definitions found in both international and Kazakh laws. For example, the ILO’s youth unemployment program defines “youth” as people aged between 15 - to 24 years. At the same time Article 1 of Law N 581 of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On State Youth Policy’ of 7 July 2004 applies a wider age band of 14 - to 29 years to define young citizens.

In this research, internal migration is understood as ‘a movement of people from one area of a country to another for the purpose or with the effect of establishing a new residence. This migration may be temporary or permanent. Internal migrants move but remain within their country of origin (e.g. rural to urban migration)’.4

The study included a poll conducted between March-May 2012 of one thousand migrants aged 14-29 who had moved to Almaty from other regions of Kazakhstan. Respondents were given a choice of answering questions in Russian or in Kazakh during face-to-face meetings with interviewer who completed written questionnaires on their behalf.

Convenience and snowball sampling were used to select respondents. Convenience sampling is a technique where subjects are selected because of their accessibility, in our case we selected survey respondents on-site. Snowball sampling allows to identify future respondents through existing study subjects.

After interviewers encountered difficulties in persuading target groups to open up it was decided that the poll would be fully anonymous omitting both the names and addresses of respondents. However, many young people remained resistant to questioning with youths from the most socially vulnerable poor groups particularly wary of any outside attempts to solicit information.

Students were interviewed at festivals, on campus and in the dormitories of leading Almaty universities, including, but not limited to KIMEP, Kazakh State University after Al-Farabi, Kazakhstan National Technical University after Satpaev, KazNAU, KazUIR&WL, Women’s Pedagogical Institute and ASU.

Interviewers also questioned young people in shopping malls (CDS, MEGA, Karkara, Megatau, Alma), grocery shops (Kopeyka, Merey, Realist), markets (Central Bazar, Altyń Orda, Tastak, Bereke, Bolashak, Zhetsysu, Kulager and other), service stations (car wash on Raiymbek st, petrol stations, parking lots and garages) and office buildings (at Raiymbek – Seifullin st, Kazibek-bi – Furmanov st. and other).

Other interviews were conducted on city streets near trade centers such as the Zhibek Zholy pedestrian walkway, the Central Stadium, the Botanical Garden, the Family amusement park, park after Mahatma Gandi, Sayakhat bus station, Almaty- 2 and Almaty- 1 railroad stations, Kalkaman and Pyatiletka microdistricts (where young people rent barrack-type tenements with

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up to 10 people sharing bunk-beds in one room), Shanyrak microdistricts (where young families share 2-3 room flats).

Young migrants from the Muslim community were interviewed near the Central Mosque and the Tastak Mosque.

A customized questionnaire was developed for this study based on our past experience of analyzing migration and remittance flows. The political and social activity of respondents was measured using methodology applied by the PPRC for Civic Engagement assessment conducted within the framework of the Civil Society Index.  

The questionnaire included several sections aimed at gathering the following information:
- general characteristics of the young migrant;
- circumstances and reasons for moving to Almaty;
- living conditions, registration at the address or lack thereof;
- access to services;
- employment, income and remittances;
- social status;
- social and political activity.

Answers were assessed using narrative evaluation, quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis. In order to broaden the range of opinions on youth migration and related policies, poll results were discussed with three focus groups involving experts, media, youth and migration NGOs and representatives of the Almaty State Foundation for the Development of Youth Policies.

In conclusion the issues identified were ranked in order of priority and a set of specific recommendations compiled for relevant policy makers.

Results of the study

The study allowed us to identify gaps in government policies related to youth migration; define the limitations of government initiatives aimed at rural youth; reveal the concerns and frustrations of young migrants living in Almaty; and obtain data to support future research and decisions aimed at addressing issues related to the internal migration of young people.

At present internal migrants are largely excluded from the government’s social policies. Unless registered with the authorities in Almaty, migrants have little chance of finding legal employment. The majority of young migrants have no pension accounts and no access to child or other social benefits.

Based on the results of the study we have developed a set of recommendations aimed at addressing the concerns of young migrants and resolving related issues that could, if left

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5 Civil Society Index methodology was developed by the Heidelberg University for CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation.
6 Civic engagements includes socially-based and political engagement.
unattended, contribute to social tension. These recommendations are addressed to the government, the legislature, the local administration and civil society organizations.

When developing internal migration policies government should invite and encourage input from a wide range of actors, including experts, civic activists and analysts that have a strategic vision of regional and national development. Practical and timely measures could help relieve the marginalization of young migrants and defuse social tensions.

We believe that the results of this study should be taken into account by local and national government, donors, Kazakh and international organizations when developing migration and regional and national development policies.

The report has the following structure:
Section 1 discusses the relevance of the study, its goal and objectives and describes the methodology applied in the work.
Section 2 reviews government internal migration and youth policies.
Section 3 presents the main findings of a poll of young migrants living in and around Almaty. Each section includes a detailed summary. The report concludes with a set of recommendations for all interested parties.
2. State youth and migration policies

2.1 Legal framework for regulation of internal migration and youth policies

Kazakhstan’s migration legislation is covered by the Constitution, Law N477-IV on Migration of 22.07.2011 and other legal acts.

Objectives of domestic migration policy as defined by the law include ‘the protection of the rights and freedoms of migrants’ (Article 4, paragraph 1.1) and the ‘optimization of internal migration flows, sustainable migration and housing of migrants’ (Article 4, paragraph 1.7).

In 2007 government adopted a Migration Policy Concept for 2007-2015 establishing that “decisions on internal migration will take into account the Strategy of Territorial Development – 2015 and the Program for Development of Rural Territories for 2004-2010”. The Accounts Committee for Control over Execution of the Republic’s Budget ruled that the ‘Program for Development of Rural Territories’ had been poorly implemented and accused the Ministry of Agriculture of failing adequately to monitor the program. The Committee said that ‘three out of six tasks crucial to the fulfillment of the Program had not been completed. In addition, the government failed to develop a program to encourage rural resettlement, particularly in areas where environmental conditions were unfavorable’.

Separately, the Ministry of Agriculture’s Program for Development of Rural Territories reported that internal migration problems had not been addressed and noted overall inconsistencies in government migration policy.

In 2008 the government adopted the Nurly Kosh program that set out to resettle Oralmans (repatriated ethnic Kazakh) and people living in economically depressed areas. After Nurly Kosh was piloted in three regions of Kazakhstan in 2009 the Commission on Human Rights gave a negative assessment of the program’s implementation.

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8 Presidential Decree N399 of 28.08.2007.
9 Approved by the Decree of the President N1149 of 10.07.2003.
11 Ibid.

Article 5 paragraph of the 2005 Law ‘On regulation of development of agriculture and rural territories’ provides that the model for optimal rural migration should be developed based on the general scheme of urban and rural planning. According to the Paragraph 1.5 of 2006-2008 Action Plan for implementation of Strategy of Territorial Development the scheme of rural and urban planning was to be developed by the IV quarter of 2008. On 17 October 2005 Prime Minister updated the timeframe for implementation of these strategies and the target date for development of the model was moved to June 2009.

Government’s Enactment N 80 of 29 January 2009 “On approving 2009-2012 Action Plan for implementation of the Strategy of Territorial Development” stipulated that the scheme for territorial organization should be developed in 2010-2012 and another Prime Minister’s decision moved the target date to June 2013.

Paragraph 9.3 of the 2004-2006 Action Plan for implementation of the Program for Development of Rural Territories” adopted by the Government on 20 August 2003 envisaged drafting amendments to the law on migration that would envisage regulation and support of rural migrants. This paragraph was later omitted.

14 Construction of oralmans’ settlements to be halted.// http://rus.azattyq.org/content/kazakh-repatriats-oralman-nurly-kosh/24621814.html
Accounts Committee was also not satisfied with the process\textsuperscript{15}, reporting that the “needs of internal migrants were not addressed” in a program that provided housing for 2,567 Kazakh ethnic immigrant families between 2009 and 2011. “Implementation of the program was fragmented. Results were not tracked and the actions of government bodies were not co-ordinated”\textsuperscript{16}.

The Employment–2020 Program launched by the government on 31 March 2011 noted that the ‘employment prospects for rural youth are a cause for concern given their limited access to vocational training and inability to compete on the labor market’. The program detailed the series of measures to increase the mobility of labor resources, and encourage young people and other residents in deprived rural areas to move to regions with greater economic potential. Social groups targeted by the program included the self-employed, unemployed and able-bodied youths from low income families in rural areas.

In July of the same year the government adopted the Regional Development Program\textsuperscript{17}, while the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Economic Development and Trade signed a joint decree ‘On criteria for determining economic potential of rural areas’.

This legislation prompted amendments to the existing Law on Migration allowing the government to introduce quotas for the resettlement of internal migrants from regions with poor environmental conditions to more economically viable regions.

In accordance with the Article 52 of the Law, quotas for internal migrants and procedure for establishing the status of settlers will come in force on 1 January 2015.

The Law on Migration established internal migrants’ rights and responsibilities (Article 51.1). “Internal migrants have a right to:

1) freedom of movement within the territory of Kazakhstan, free choice of place of residence except in cases explicitly stipulated by the law;

2) protection from forced displacement from their place of permanent or temporary residence;

3) employment assistance”.

“Internal migrants shall register at their place of residence in Kazakhstan in accordance with the procedure established by the Government” (Article 51.2). Registration procedure is stipulated by the Government’s Enactment N1427 of 01 December 2011 ‘On approving Rules of Registration of Internal Migrants and amending previous decisions of the Government of Kazakhstan” and amendments to this enactment made on 19 March 2012. The new Rules of Registration of Internal Migrants provide for more restrictive control of internal migration including use of fines and penalties.

Any analysis of internal migration processes requires knowledge of registration requirements that apply to all residents of Kazakhstan\textsuperscript{18}.

\textbf{Propiska}

\textit{Propiska} - registration of citizens at the place of their primary residence – was introduced by the Soviet Union in 1922 and enabled government to collect data and track all movements of citizens. Until 1932 simple notification of housing authorities was enough to obtain a temporary or permanent propiska.

\begin{itemize}
\item[15] Accounts Committee is not satisfied with the 2009-2011 results of the Nurly Kosh program.//
\texttt{http://nomad.su/?a=3-201205160028}
\end{itemize}
In 1932 Soviet Union introduced a centralized passport system and established a Passport and Visa Service within the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD). The service was mandated to «register residents of cities, workers’ settlement and new developments; remove persons that are not involved in socially useful labor; rooting out kulaks, criminal and other antisocial elements with the purpose of strengthening dictatorship of the proletariat” (Enactment of VCheKa and Council of People’s Commissars of 27.12.32 ‘On centralized passport system for Union of SSR and mandatory registration of passports’). The Passport Service duties included registering citizens at their place of residence. Between 1933 and 1935 the procedure for obtaining propiska gradually became more restrictive and straightforward notification was replaced with the requirement to obtain authorization from authorities before taking up residence.

Propiska related requirements became an increasingly intrusive instrument of government control, rigidly regulating the lives of Soviet citizens. The place of birth and even maternity clinic of every child was determined by the propiska of parents. Propiska also assigned specific kindergartens and schools and were a prerequisite for employment and access to housing. Government agencies had the right to decide the number of people that could be housed in individual apartments and could give permission for additional people to move into housing without any agreement from existing residents. At the same time authorities were empowered randomly to revoke registration for those who were absent from their primary place of residence without ‘legitimate excuse’ for more than six months. Some cities and areas had a special propiska regime that made it impossible to settle there without prior consent of high-level authorities. Although some members of rural population were allowed to have passports, all kolkhoz workers were denied this privilege meaning that they were bound to their collective farms and could not change their official place of residence.

Liberalization of the passport system started in 1974 when passports were issued to all Soviet Union citizens. However, the propiska system remained in force and still required authorization from authorities. Citizens visiting other cities were required to obtain temporary residential permits stamped by the authorities.

Source: Propiska and its evolution.
Background note to the Meeting of the Commission on Human Rights under the President of Russian Federation. 25.11.2003.

Under current legislation, Kazakh citizens are required to be “registered at the addresses of residential houses, apartments, country house collectives and groups, dormitories, hotels, resorts, medical institutions, assisted living facilities, boarding facilities and communities, business premises’ (paragraph 28 of the Rules). In order to register, citizens are obliged ‘within ten days of their arrival to submit the following documents to the authorities:

- formal application,
- official record confirming de-registration at the previous place of residence,
- identification documents,
- male citizens of an age eligible to serve in the armed forces should also provide a military record or service registration card bearing the official military registration stamp’ (paragraph 30).

Internal migration data is tracked by the Agency for Statistics using information supplied by the Migration Police Committee and Public Service Centers that collect registration and de-registration records. When internal migrants choose not to de-register at their previous address, their transfer to a new place of residence is not recorded in official statistics.

The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific have reported that, “the registration accuracy of migrants is
problematic. This concerns both incoming and outgoing migration and also both international as internal migrants”. 19

For the purposes of our study we have also reviewed the Decision N 311 of Almaty Maslikhat (dated 12 April 2010) 20 that establishes the “Procedure for regulating migration in the city of Almaty”. In accordance with this decision, “Almaty law enforcement agencies shall register residents at place of residence 21 independently of type of ownership. In state-owned or municipal housing, the number of registered residents shall not exceed the usable floor area limits a minimum fifteen square meter per person.

Citizens shall be registered in accordance with the established procedure at the address of their permanent residence, including houses, apartments, country house collectives and groups, dormitories, hotels, resorts, medical institutions, assisted living facilities, boarding facilities and communities, business premises’.

Domicile or residency 22 without registration is an administrative offence. July 2011 amendments to the Article 377 of the Code on Administrative Violations 23 impose ‘a fine of up to five monthly calculation indexes for residency without registration’. The Code also imposes fines on home owners found registering persons that do not reside at their address (Article 378 of the Code. Violation of the rules on registration of internal migrants by the homeowner or other persons 24).

All of the laws and other legal acts regulating migration and youth policies were adopted independently of one another and are not part of any common policy.

The Law on Youth Policy in the Republic of Kazakhstan was adopted back in 2004. It defines ‘youth policy’ as a ‘set of social, economic, political and legal measures taken by the state and aimed at supporting the young’. Objectives of the youth policy include ‘protection of rights and interests of young people; provision of assistance and social services; implementation of socially important initiatives of the young” (Article 3.2). Article 5 of the law lists fifteen focus areas for government youth policy. Migration of young people does not feature.

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20 Registered by the Department of Justice on 17 May 2010. Né 843
21 Residency or domicile are established at the location of permanent or primary residence (primary residence is when the duration of stay exceeds three months).
23 Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan N 478-IV
24 1. Allowing registration of persons that do not reside in houses, buildings and/or premises by the owners or administrators of these premises is subject to a penalty of:
- five monthly calculation indexes for individuals,
- fifteen monthly calculation indexes for owners of small and medium businesses and non-profit organizations,
- twenty monthly calculation indexes for large businesses.
2. The same act committed repeatedly within a year after the first administrative offence is punishable by a fine to the amount of:
- ten monthly calculation indexes for individuals
- twenty five monthly calculation indexes for owners of small and medium businesses and non-profit organizations,
- thirty monthly calculation indexes for large businesses.
3. Failure of homeowners or building administrators to de-register persons that do not reside permanently at the specified place of residence is subject to penalty of:
- ten monthly calculation indexes for individuals
- twenty monthly calculation indexes for owners of small and medium businesses and non-profit organizations,
- forty monthly calculation indexes for large businesses.
4. Same act (prescribed by the paragraph 3) committed repeatedly within a year after the first administrative offence is punishable by a fine to the amount of:
- twenty monthly calculation indexes for individuals
- forty monthly calculation indexes for owners of small and medium businesses and non-profit organizations,
- eighty monthly calculation indexes for large businesses.
Many provisions of this law, including ‘employment guarantees’, ‘rights and social protection guarantees for the disabled and graduates from orphanages’, and ‘public assistance to young families’ remain declarative and have not been translated into practical result.

Among the plethora of documents on youth policy, only one mentions young migrants. The 2008-2015 Concept on Supporting and Developing Competitiveness of Young People\(^{25}\) notes that ‘labor market trends include spontaneous migration of the rural population (particularly young people) to urban areas. Limited access to housing and inability to register prevent rural youth from finding legal employment in the cities… In reality internal migrants have low adaptation skills. Their situation is further complicated by spontaneous migration patterns unrelated to any state or industry backed programs and by the lack of registration’. The Concept clearly describes challenges faced by the young migrants, but none of the issues raised have been addressed in the 5 years since the Concept was adopted.

The Concept planned that ‘improving adaptation of internal migrants, developing mechanisms for regulation of internal migration and socialization of marginalized youth, identifying ways to adapt rural migrants to urban conditions will be implemented via:

- improvement of policies related to internal labor migration of rural young, reestablishment of the social benefits and privileges system for university graduates willing to work in economically depressed agricultural regions;
- opening business incubators in rural areas;
- promoting internship programs for vocational school graduates;
- forecasting demand of labor resources;
- pilot and model projects on rural logistics, tourism and services infrastructure;
- measures on rational allocation of labor resources between the regions;
- monitoring and analysis of loan societies; classification of rural areas by their economic potential for the purpose of pilot resettlement from depressed regions’.

So far the ‘improvement of policies related to internal labor migration of young people’ has not happened. Just one of the above measures – the re-establishment of social benefits for university graduates employed to work in economically deprived settlements – has been implemented. All the other plans, including the ‘development of a model for optimal migration of rural population in accordance with the Program on Territorial Development for 2015 and Strategy of Innovation and Industrial Development’ remained unfulfilled. Development of services in rural areas has proved to be complicated due to low purchasing power of the population. Provisions addressing youth housing issues were only partially implemented.

The Law on Employment targets young people under 21 years of age as a priority group for receiving ‘government assistance in employment issues’ (Article 5.2). Article 18-2 of this law established a youth internship program for university and college graduates who have no working experience.\(^{26}\) According to this provision ‘the government shall develop a procedure for and funding of internship programs for young people’ (Article 5-1), while local executive bodies are responsible for the ‘organization of internship programs’. Under this program graduates can accept an internship with any organization offering such positions upon agreement with the local executive body.

The Law stipulates that the ‘number of internship positions should be unlimited; internships should be offered only for temporary positions that cannot be created at the expense of

\(^{25}\) Approved by the Government’s Enactment N 516 of 20.06.2007.

\(^{26}\) Amendments to the Law on Employment made in accordance with the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan N 444-IV of 27.06.2011
permanent jobs’. Youth internship programs are available for ‘graduates below 29 years of age who have been officially registered as unemployed”. Candidates should not have received pension contributions since graduation. Almaty Employment and Social Programs Department oversee this provision by checking candidates’ pension savings history with the State Pensions Center. The government pays 100% of interns’ monthly salary to the amount of KZT 15,000 (before tax).

In Almaty young migrants without registration documents have no access to the internship program. In an online memo for university graduates, the Almaty akimat explains that ‘internship candidates that have no permanent registration in Almaty can ask for a referral from the Almaty Unemployment Benefits Office’. However, the law requires youth internship candidates to be officially registered as unemployed, which is impossible without domicile registration in Almaty. The city employment offices are convinced that the youth internship program is open exclusively to candidates officially registered as residents of Almaty. Another barrier is that 15,000 KZT is not enough to survive in Almaty for the 6 month period of the internship.

Youth internship programs in Almaty are limited in scope and do not provide effective solutions to the problem of youth unemployment. The Almaty Employment and Social Programs Department in its 2011-2015 Strategic Plan made provisions for 350 internship candidates in 2011, 200 – in 2012, and 400 annually in 2013-2015. Yet the Department’s records show that that just in 2011 alone, the government sponsored 759 young interns: this above target performance is hardly surprising given the modest goals set by the plan.

It is important to note that Department’s efficiency is measured by the number of internship referrals rather than the results of internship programs. There is no information on whether any of the 759 young interns went on to find permanent jobs. Although the program is intended to alleviate youth unemployment, there is no provision for the Department to follow up on young graduates after their internships come to an end.

The Law on Youth Policy has not stood the test of time. Government developed a new draft and submitted it to Parliament in March 2012. However, these amendments were criticized by MPs for the lack of implementation mechanisms and returned to the government without discussion.

Some of the government’s youth initiatives have touched upon internal migration issues. As the majority of internal migrants move from the rural to urban areas, the government has attempted to regulate internal migration by addressing the problems of the rural young.

The 2009 Law N 111-IV ‘On amendments relating to social assistance and incentives to public sector workers in rural areas’ was aimed at recruiting public sector employees to work in rural settlements, improving access to services and bridging the income gap between rural and urban areas.

The Law offered workers the following incentives:

a) single payment of relocation allowance equivalent to 70 monthly calculation units (89,100 KZT) from 1 July 2009;

b) housing assistance – from 1 January 2010, government provides a 0.01% credit equivalent to 630 monthly calculation units (801,990 KZT) to be repaid within 15 years;

c) a salary increase of at least 25 % for all public sector employees located in the rural areas to be paid from the national budget.

29 Ibid.
As the proposed 630 MCU were insufficient to buy a house, the government increased the limit to 1,500 MCU with specific amount to be determined by housing prices at the time of disbursement. In cases where houses cost more than the credit limit, young public workers are required to cover the gap themselves.

The effectiveness of this program is questionable. Focus group participants noted that even the 25% salary increase was insufficient to motivate public workers to relocate to rural areas.

Auyl Zhastary is another national initiative aimed at supporting young people in rural areas. Its 2009-2011 Action Plan was envisaged among other activities, ‘regional studies to identify the problems and concerns of rural youth, events to encourage rural youth organizations, competitions for the development of agriculture and farming business plans and rural youth business clubs’.

The President’s website www.akorda.kz gives an outline of this initiative and states that ‘social assistance measures to the amount of 21.5 billion KZT will be implemented in 2009-2011 within the national budget programs’.

**Key activities under the Auyl Zhastary initiative:**

1. monitoring and analysis of the problems that affect young people in rural areas;
2. providing rural youth with social rights and guarantees, including measures to improve access to education, healthcare, employment and programs to support young families;
3. increasing information opportunities in rural areas (government sponsorship of media articles and coverage on specific issues);
4. supporting young professionals in rural areas (relocation allowance, housing and credit programs);
5. development and support to rural youth NGOs (local budget sponsored social projects);
6. increasing civic participation and leadership potential of rural young;
7. promoting healthy lifestyles and decreasing youth deviant behavior (social work, sport events, recreation);
8. supporting and encouraging young talent (exhibitions, contests, awards, festivals);
9. improving legislation to create conditions for the development of rural youth.

It is difficult to evaluate the government’s progress in any of these areas since none of the government’s websites (including those of the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Education) provide sufficient information about the results of the studies. The government does not publicize or promote this program in any way. Even the youth policy and internal migration experts that took part in our focus groups found it difficult to remember that the initiative existed.

A brief outline of Auyl Zhastary 2009 results was published by the Ministry of Education. According to this very optimistic account, ‘In 2009 Auyl Zhastary was most effectively implemented in relation to:

- providing rural young with social rights and guarantees,
- implementing measures to improve access to education, healthcare, employment and programs to support young families;

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31 Adopted by the Decision N 76-p of the Prime Minister of 25.05.2009.
• increasing information opportunities in rural areas (government sponsorship of media coverage);
• supporting young professionals in rural areas (relocation allowance, housing and credit programs) within the framework of the ‘With a degree – to the village’ program;
• promoting healthy lifestyles and decreasing youth deviant behavior (sport events and competitions);
• supporting and encouraging young talent (exhibitions, contests, awards, festivals) in rural areas”.

This short report does not provide answers to any of the most pertinent questions about Auyl Zhastary work in 2009. It is impossible to deduce how national and regional funds were used, what specific activities were undertaken or who monitored and analyzed problems affecting rural youth.

It is unclear what was done to guarantee social rights of young people in the regions, to improve access to education, healthcare, employment and to support young families. What was done to improve informational opportunities in rural regions? How does placement of state sponsored articles increase information opportunities?

The government does not report on the number of young professionals that relocate to rural regions, or disclose the total amount of allowances and housing benefits allocated to this target group. What measures were taken to develop and support NGOs working with rural youth? What was done to improve civic activism and improve leadership skills of young people in the regions? How can the public evaluate progress towards these goals? How did Auyl Zhastary contribute to promoting healthy lifestyles and reducing deviant youth behavior in rural regions?

The government and relevant ministries fail to provide any information that would help to answer these questions. Probably the Accounts Committee has some answers.

Participants of the focus groups were not aware of this initiative. Our researchers managed to uncover just a few facts about Auyl Zhastary results scattered through the interviews of public officials. Lack of detailed information makes it impossible to evaluate the initiative’s progress. For example, when looking for the data on subsidized loans researchers found an article describing the “Rural Mortgage” program managed by the Foundation for Financial Support of Agriculture. According to the article, over the past two years ‘4,747 young people have received 0.01% loans from the state; while the total amount of loans exceeded 6 billion KZT’.

In order to address shortages of skilled staff in rural areas, Zhas Otan (the youth branch of Nur Otan political party) developed a conceptual project in 2010 dubbed ‘With a degree – to the village!”. This initiative was based on the core provisions of the 2008 Law “On state support to the healthcare, education, culture, sports and social workers planning to relocate to rural settlements” and also repeated many of the measures outlined in the Auyl Zhastary program. Zhas Otan described the project as an attempt to act as an ‘intermediary between young professionals and prospective employers in the villages’.

Zhas Otan’s plan was to create an electronic database to cover the following:

1. information about the project participants with full contact details (CVs, fact sheets);
2. vacancies available in each region of the country.

33 ‘Over 4,700 young professionals received subsidized loans’. Interview of Medet Tokpay, the Director of the Credit Department of the Foundation for Financial Support of Agriculture. 14.03.2012. http://www.kursiv.kz/novosti/v-kazakhstane/1195222196-svyshe-4-tys-700-molodyx-specialistov-v-rrk-poluchili-kredity-pod-001.html
It remains unclear whether any of these databases were in fact launched although it appears that the scheme received funds from the state budget. Many youth activists note that Zhas Otan and Zhasyl El receive most of the funds allocated by the government for youth policy implementation.34

The activities and approaches of different youth programs frequently overlap. Distribution of funds tends to be incoherent. The Auyl Zhastary-2009 report mentions that “With a degree – to the village!” is a program implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture, but does not attempt to explain why the Ministry became involved in implementation of the political party’s program.

In a recent speech, Nursultan Nazarbaev addressed youth policy issues. According to Kazakh president, the central government will allocate 21.6 billion KZT in 2012-2014 to involve over 16,000 young professionals in the “With a degree – to the village” program.35

Nazarbaev went on to say that “the total state funding for national youth programs, including “Auyl Zhastary”, “With a degree – to the village’, “Youth Internships’ and “Zhasyl El” currently amounts to 37.7 billion KZT. Zhasyl El activists have planted over 43 million nursery plants covering 80 thousand hectares of land.

Some 1.2 million square metres of housing for young families will be built by 2020. Young professionals account for 25% of public sector employees. We create conditions to involve young people in sports; - fifteen hundred new sports facilities have opened over the past year.

Providing employment and jobs for young people is one of our topmost priorities. The Employment-2020 program includes a successful Youth Internship project. This year 15 thousand graduates will benefit from this project and the government funding will amount to 2.7 billion KZT”.36

Nazarbaev indicated that state youth policy was likely to change saying that “by 1 November 2012 the government will develop a draft Concept on Youth Policy up to 2020.37 A new law on youth policy will be adopted by the end of 201238.

It is planned ‘to create a Committee on Youth Policy under the Ministry of Education and youth policy departments in each of the country’s regions. The akims of Astana, Almaty and the regions will personally preside over the Council on Youth Affairs”.39

President requested the government to create incentives for greater social mobility by “developing a set of legislative, social and economic measures aimed at building social lifts for young people”40.

He also instructed the Ministry of Education and Science to “investigate the possibilities for organizing a ‘Youth’ research center under the auspices of the Eurasian University”.41

Nazarbaev concluded with a call for an improvement in the performance of the Nur Otan’s youth division. “The Nur Otan party apparatus need to develop and adopt a 2020 Strategic Action Plan for Zhas Otan”.

34 Youth policy in free fall. Results of discussion on state’s youth policy. http://www.ipr.kz/kipr/3/1/50#.T7o6Ank9VqY
36 Ibid
37 Ibid
38 Ibid
39 Ibid
40 Ibid
41 Ibid
Conclusions

In recent years, the government has introduced several initiatives in the sphere of internal migration and youth policy. However, youth migration remains outside the scope of the government’s youth policy. Migration laws, rules and strategies have been adopted independently of any debate about youth policy.

Young people have not been invited to contribute to development of these initiatives. The failure to take their opinion into account significantly decreases the efficiency of government’s efforts to improve the lot of the youth. Some focus group members went as far as to describe the programs adopted so far as ‘a means to embezzle money allocated for improving conditions in rural areas’.

The Accounts Committee noted that the Nurly Kosh program was undermined by the lack of monitoring and insufficient co-operation between the government departments. The same is true of all other initiatives aimed at providing social assistance to professionals in rural areas (“With a degree – to the village”, “Auyyl Zhastary”, “Youth Internship” to name but a few). No data is available allowing for a proper assessment of their progress and impact. Non-transparent budgeting, weak reporting and the absence of any visible impact to date combine to suggest that these costly programs are unlikely to be successful.

Government reporting methodology prevents any serious assessment of the effectiveness of the Youth Internship program. For instance, Department of Employment and Social Programs reports on the ‘number of internship positions filled’ rather than the number of young people that found permanent gainful employment after their internship. As the Department does not follow up on the activities of internship graduates, it is impossible for the government to report on the number of real jobs created by the program.

Programs designed to encourage university graduates to work in rural areas are critically important, but in their current form lack clarity and have little connection with realities of rural life. It is almost impossible to hope that university graduates will commit to long term employment in rural areas given the poor infrastructure and limited access to services prevalent in the regions. Members of the focus groups pointed out that rural areas lack the most basic comforts and amenities, including potable water, reliable electricity supplies, gas, roads, internet access, sports and recreation facilities. Young people simply refuse to live and work in such deprived conditions. Even if the government was to develop all necessary infrastructure, steps would have to be taken to maintain facilities. The only way to bring about any long-term improvement to rural living conditions is to create jobs and stimulate development of the agricultural and food processing businesses.

The registration of internal migrants is yet another serious issue that needs to be addressed. None of the government agencies know how many migrants live in Almaty and the percentage of young people in the migrant community. The policy of increasing penalties for non-registered migrants has backfired, fueling corruption and evasion instead of decreasing migration flows as officially intended.

Rising urban unemployment rates, higher housing prices and the growing disparity in living conditions have combined to stoke social tensions. The reality that Almaty is seeing an ever larger number of young migrants cannot be ignored. Instead of hoping to return young migrants to rural areas, the government should try to address problems they face in their current, city location.

2.2. State bodies for regulating migration and management of youth policies

The Law on Migration of the Population defines fundamental ‘principles of managing migration’ and related powers vested in the Government, ministries and other public agencies. Amendments
to the migration law enacted in April 2012 introduce quotas for internal migrants to be enforced from 1 January 2015 (Article 8.3).

In 2010 responsibility for regulating migration flows and coordinating the implementation of government migration policy was transferred to the Migration Committee under the Ministry of Interior replacing an earlier arrangement where the Migration Committee, together with its territorial divisions was controlled by the Ministry of Labour.

The Ministry of Interior and Agency for Statistics monitor and keep count of internal migrants. Public Service Centers under the Ministry of Interior register incoming and outgoing residents, allowing the authorities to keep track of population movements. The Migration Police Committee collects internal migration data, while the Agency for Statistics monitors and analyses the numbers of incoming and outgoing residents in each region. Data about the gender, age, ethnicity and education of different population groups is also collected.

The Migration Police Committee is required to carry out a number of duties related to internal migration, including:

- implementation of government policy on the regulation of migratory processes;
- overseeing interdepartmental co-ordination of migration-related activities;
- developing measures aimed at regulating migration flows;
- monitoring migration;
- controlling compliance with the migration law;
- adopting regulations on migration;
- recommending internal migration quotas to the Government;
- distributing internal migration quotas between the regions, major cities and the capital city;
- keeping count and providing for registration of Kazakh citizens;
- registering and de-registering Kazakh citizens at place of residence;
- providing temporary registration of Kazakh citizens at temporary place of residence;
- fulfilling other duties in accordance with the Law on Migration and other laws, decrees of the President and decisions of the Government.

State youth policy is developed by the Youth Policy Committee under the Ministry of Education. Other ministries also participate in development of youth-focused programs, e.g. Ministry of Agriculture was given responsibility for overseeing a number of policy initiatives related to young people in the rural areas.

A new Department on Youth Policy Issues was created in Almaty in January 2009, but the migration of the young people is not on this agency’s radar.

Yet another Almaty-based organization overseeing the implementation of youth policy is the so-called State Foundation for Development of Youth Policy established by the city akim on 2

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42 Four agencies were transferred from the Migration Committee to the Migration Police Committee: Karaganda, Shymkent, Aksukent and Aktau Centers for Adaptation and Integration of Oralmans

43 Government’s Enactment N1009 of 30 September 2010 “On measures to increase effectiveness of law-enforcement and legal system in the Republic of Kazakhstan”

44 Head of the Almaty Department on Youth Policy Issues never replied to an invitation to take part in a focus group on migration of young people to Almaty.
March 2001.\textsuperscript{45} The Foundation was initially intended to cover a number of specific areas, including the development of social services for young people, awards and grants to exemplary students, youth employment, sports and science projects and the like. However, the Foundation’s activity plan for 2011 reveals a narrow focus on feel-good events, such as youth festivals, sports, games and public image campaigns. Migration issues and concerns of young migrants do not feature on the Foundation’s agenda.

The Council on Youth Policies under the President is a consultative body established in 2008 with the purpose of improving youth policies (Presidential Decree N625 of 1.07. 2008)\textsuperscript{46}.

The Council’s mission includes the following objectives:

- development of recommendations on priorities, approaches and implementation of public policies related to young people;
- informing the President of Kazakhstan about the circumstances of the young people;
- analyzing the impact of youth policy and identifying areas for improvement;
- discussing other concerns relating to public policies that affect young people.

The minutes of the Council’s meetings are not readily available and details of its agenda remain unknown. State youth policy so far never touched upon the migration issues, so one can deduce that the Council never addressed migration concerns.

Conclusions

National youth policy is being undermined by the lack of co-ordination, incomplete reporting and the insufficient transparency of government bodies.

Two of government agencies in Almaty are involved in the implementation of youth policies, including the Department of Youth Policy Issues and the State Foundation for Development of Youth Policy. Both these entities focus on the trappings of youth policy, such as organization of festivals, games and campaigns. Meanwhile, young migrants in Almaty are left to their own devices and have nowhere to turn to with their problems.

2.3. Statistics on internal migration and migration of young people to Almaty

Internal migration in Kazakhstan is mainly driven by economic factors: people from villages and environmentally hazardous areas move to places where economic prospects are better.

Over the past decade, the majority of migrants relocated to Almaty, Atyrau, Astana and the Mangistau. This trend is clearly demonstrated by net migration rates shown in Table 1. Astana and Almaty are the most popular destinations with highest net inflow of migrants in 2011. Almaty saw a two-fold increase in net migration from 8.8 ths. in 2010 to 22.5 ths. in 2011, while net migration to Astana decreased from 33.8 ths. in 2010 to 31.1 ths. during the same period. Several regions have negative net migration rates, including Zhambyl (11.2 ths.), South Kazakhstan (9.9 ths.) and East Kazakhstan (9.3 ths.).

\textsuperscript{45} Almaty – the city of the young. Implementation of the state youth policy in Almaty. 2011. p99
\textsuperscript{46} www.akorda.kz
The Agency for Statistics’ official records on internal migration are calculated using registration and de-registration certificates issued by the Ministry of Interior. Therefore the statistical data does not include those migrants who choose not to apply for registration at their new place of residence. Many internal migrants fail to register. For example, migrants from rural areas frequently have no permanent place of residence in the city and abandon attempts to register with the city authorities.

The 2009 census failed to establish the actual ratio of the rural to the urban population. According to the census, the percentage of the population living in rural areas has increased over the past 20 years. In 1989 census showed that 57.1% of the population in Kazakhstan lived in urban areas and the remaining 42.9% in rural areas. The results of the 2009 census show a decrease in the urban population to 54.1%, and an increase in the rural population to 45.9%. The change in population patterns can be partly explained by amendments to the Law ‘On administrative and territorial structure of the Republic of Kazakhstan’ that redefined the status of urban-type settlements independent of major cities as rural boroughs. This change of territorial division is reflected in statistical decrease of urban population from 8,833.3 ths. in 1989 to 8,265.9 ths. in 2006, while rural population grew from 6,563.6 to 7,305.6 ths.

The difficulty migrants experience obtaining registration in cities also raises questions about the accuracy of official population statistics. As many migrants prefer to avoid bureaucratic hurdles and remain registered in their rural homelands, the official statistics do not provide a true picture of the proportion of Kazakh citizens living in the cities and countryside.

Another possible cause of inaccuracies lies in the faulty budgeting practices. As government funding for rural development is allocated on the basis of the number of residents in any given

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49 N 184-III of 4 November 2006, in force from 1 January 2007
region, local authorities may be tempted to inflate population figures in a move to obtain larger funds.

According to the 2009 census, 4.5 million of Kazakh citizens were aged 14-29\textsuperscript{50}, with men and women in equal proportion. This data suggests that young people accounted for 28% of national population. The census said that 2.48 millions of young people lived in the cities and 2.02 million young people lived in rural areas. However, there was a larger concentration of 14-15 year olds in rural areas - 145.7 ths. 14 year olds as compared to 128 ths. in the cities, and 150.1 ths. 15 year olds as compared to 134.6 ths. in the cities. The majority of young people over 15 years of age reside in the cities. We believe that these statistics indicate that young people start leaving the countryside after graduating from the 9\textsuperscript{th} grade at school. For example, in the 16-19 year-old age bracket, 693.3 ths. youths reside in the cities compared to 567 ths. in the regions. In older age groups the urban population continues to exceed the rural population: 913.3 ths. of 20-24 year olds live in the cities vs. 691.8 ths. in rural areas. 618.6 ths. of 25-28 year olds reside in urban areas, while just 468 ths. remain in the villages. Once again these statistics do not account for those young people who relocate to the cities in search of work, but remain registered in rural areas.

Gender statistics shows that women account for a higher percentage of the young urban population (51.1% vs. 48.9% of men). The pattern in rural areas is different with women accounting for 48.5% of the rural population and men for the remaining 51.5%.

**Chart 2. Young people by the Kazakh regions**

Regions with highest number of young people include South Kazakhstan (723.7 ths. or 16.1% of total number of young people), Almaty oblast (510.5 ths. or 11.3%) and the city of Almaty (424 ths. or 9.4%).

Almaty is a popular destination due to the developed infrastructure and the high concentration of colleges and universities.\textsuperscript{51} One third of the institutes of higher education in Kazakhstan are

\textsuperscript{51} Regions of Kazakhstan. Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Statistics. Astana 2012., p.11
located in Almaty, including 47 of the country’s total 146 universities and 69 of 804 vocational and professional colleges\textsuperscript{52}.

Chart 3. Youth migration to Алматы in 2011 by age groups

![Chart 3. Youth migration to Алматы in 2011 by age groups]

Source: Almaty Department of Statistics \texttt{http://rus.almaty.gorstat.kz/social_sp/page/2/}

According to the official statistics, young people accounted for 31.5\% (456.1 ths.) of Almaty population in January 2012.\textsuperscript{53} Youths in the 17-22 age bracket are the most numerous groups, accounting for 73.7\% of young migrants to the city. This proportion can be explained by the fact that young people come to Almaty to study or in search of work right after they graduate high school. Some of these migrants are not registered in the city and their relocation is not accounted for in official statistics.

Young people accounted for 71.3\% (33.4 ths.) of the internal migrants that arrived in Almaty during the course of 2011. Among them were 22 thousand women. Some 11.5 ths. young people including 6.6 ths. young women left Almaty in 2011, accounting for 48.3\% of all those who moved away. As a result net migration of young people to Almaty amounted to 21.9 ths. in 2011. The majority of incoming youths – a total of 7.6 ths. - were aged 18 years.

In 2011 forty-seven education institutions in Almaty (10 of them public) had 183.2 ths. students\textsuperscript{54} (including 105.4 ths. women, Chart 4). Students’ age ranged from 16 years – to 29 years with the majority in the 17 year – to 22 year age bracket.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53} Migration in Almaty in January-December 2011 Almaty Department of Statistics \texttt{http://rus.almaty.gorstat.kz/social_sp/page/2/}
\textsuperscript{54} Almaty higher education institutions at the start of the 2011-2012 year \texttt{http://rus.almaty.gorstat.kz/social_sp/}
Majority of students (130.3 ths.) pay for their education, 50 ths. receive public grants and the remaining 2.8 ths. study under the public contract system (Chart 5).

**Chart 5. Education funding: grants, state contract and paid tuition**

*Source: Almaty Department of Statistics. Higher educational institutions in Almaty at the start of 2011-2012*
Conclusions

Almaty is an attractive destination for internal migrants, particularly the young. In 2011 young people aged 14-29 accounted for 72.3% of the total number of incoming migrants. As a result Almaty has a relatively high 31.6% proportion of young people among its population. The inflow of young people is largely due to high concentration of universities and colleges in the city. Youth policy decision-makers should give greater attention to the challenges young people face.

An analysis of official statistics reveals that the rural population will constantly age as many young people leave the villages as soon as they turn 15. Obtaining reliable statistics on internal migration is difficult, largely because of complicated registration procedures in the cities. Data in 2009 census that revealed a 3% increase in rural population over the past 20 years is inconsistent with the real scale of the migration from rural areas to the cities.

Year by year Almaty has seen a larger number of incoming than outgoing young migrants. Internal migrants that do not register in the city are not accounted for in the statistics, making it impossible to pinpoint the exact number of young people living in Almaty.

3. Results of the study on migration of young people in Almaty

3.1. General characteristics of the respondents

The survey included 1,000 Almaty migrants aged 14 - 29 (Chart 6). Men accounted for 52.6% of the respondents and women for the remaining 47.4%. As the majority of young migrants in Almaty are ethnic Kazakhs they were the largest group included in the survey accounting for 84.9% of total respondents. Other ethnic groups represented included Russians - 4.2%, Uighurs - 3.3%, Tatars - 1.3%, Koreans - 0.8%, Ukrainians - 0.2%. 5.3% from other ethnic background.

Chart 6. Age of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Youth migration database

Some 73.1% of respondents were single, 21.4 % - married, 3% - in common-law marriage, 2.2% - divorced and 0.3% - separated.

Chart 7 gives an overview of the educational level of respondents. More than one third of survey participants were studying for their first degree, 26.6% - were high school graduates, and 18.2% - had a higher education degree.
Respondents come from all regions of Kazakhstan (Chart 8).

**Chart 8. Young migrants by region of origin**

A large proportion of respondents come from Almaty oblast (28.1%), South Kazakhstan (18.9%) and Zhambyl (15.7%) regions. This high percentage can be explained by several factors. Firstly, families in the south of the country traditionally have many children. Data provided by the Agency for Statistics shows that 16% of all young people in the country live in South
Kazakhstan (Chart 2). Secondly southern regions are relatively poor with a per capita gross regional product (GRP)\textsuperscript{55} of between 30-40\% below the national average GRP. As a result, the average income of people living in the south is the lowest in the country. In 2011 nominal incomes in South Kazakhstan were 34\% of Almaty levels, in Zhambyl region –38\%, and in Almaty oblast - 43\% of city levels\textsuperscript{56}.

Detailed analysis shows that 58\% of respondents came to Almaty from the villages and rural settlements, 15\% from the towns with populations of less than 100 ths., and 27\% from cities with populations larger than 100 ths. residents.

**Table 1. Communities migrants come from**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of residence before moving to Almaty:</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City with population over 100 ths. residents</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town with population under 100 ths. residents</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village/aul</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Youth migration database*

When answering the question, “Do you reside together with your family members in Almaty?” 43.1\% of respondents said ‘yes’ and 56.9\% – ‘no’. Those who replied ‘yes’ listed all the family members that lived with them, a total of 450 people. Therefore, our research reflects the situation not only for the 1,000 survey participants, but also for 450 members of their families who are also internal migrants.

Among the respondents who live together with relatives, 44.4\% live with a spouse, 36/9\% with one or more brothers, 27.3\% with a sister or a son, 23.3 \% – with their mother, 20.9\% with a daughter, 17.3\% with their father, 2.4\% with their fiancé, 0.3\% with a grandmother.

Relatives sharing homes with migrants are mostly young: 93.1\% respondents reported that their relatives are 18-30 years of age, 37.5\% - younger than 5 years, 19.9\% - between 5 and 10 years of age. Just 30.4\% respondents live together with relatives who are between 30 and 50 years, and 20.5\% – with relatives over 50 years of age.

The level of education of relatives varies from high-school diploma (91\%), professional or post-secondary degree (50.3\%), university degree (1.3\%), elementary education (1.3\%) and no education at all (2\%).

When answering the question “Do you plan to leave Almaty within the next five years?” 68\% of respondents replied “no”, 22.3\% were not yet sure, 5.4 \% planned to return to their place of origin, 3.1\% - planned to move to another city and 1.2\% wanted to move to a different country.

Out of 680 respondents planning to remain in Almaty, the majority (226) were studying for a higher education degree; 141 already had a first degree, 181 had a high-school diploma, 66 had a vocational college degree and 46 were studying for a vocational degree.

As for employment, 50.1\% of respondents planning to remain in Almaty were wage earners, 40.3\% – students and 15\% – self-employed.

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\textsuperscript{55} Calculations made by the author based on the *Regions of Kazakhstan* data. Agency for Statistics. Astana, 2012., p.16

\textsuperscript{56} Calculations made by the author based on the *Regions of Kazakhstan* data. Agency for Statistics. Astana, 2012., p.12
Those planning to leave Almaty gave the following reasons for their decision: ‘move closer to family and sort out personal issues’ (76.9%); “look for work and employment opportunities” – 15.3%; ‘continue studies abroad’ – 3.5%. Some 1.8% of respondents said the high cost of living in Almaty, shortages of housing and jobs, and adverse environmental conditions had influenced their decision to leave. Some 1.4% respondents believed opportunities would be better in Astana. Some 1.1% said they wanted to leave because of the lack of state assistance and opportunities for personal development as well as corruption.

In answer to the question ‘Is one or both of your parents an immigrant or oralman?’, some 4.6% of respondents said their mother was an immigrant, and 4.9% - their father. As the research focused on internal migrants, there were few responses from young oralmans. The poll included only those immigrants who initially settled in other regions of Kazakhstan, only later moving to Almaty.

Answering the question ‘Do you belong to any religion or confession and if yes, which one?’ 91.6% of respondents described themselves as Muslims, 4.2% – Orthodox Christians, 4.1% did not belong to any confession, and 0.1% were Catholics.

At the same time, 91.9% of respondents described themselves as believers and 8.1% are non-believers 57 independently of any religious confession. We drew a distinction in our survey between religious affiliation and faith asking separate questions on both. While the former focuses on religious tradition and worship within a specific confession of Islam, Christianity, Buddhism or Judaism, the latter refers to believing in god and following his will.

Conclusions

The majority of young migrants in Almaty are ethnic Kazakhs who have come to the city from neighboring territories in the south of the country where there is a high proportion of young people in the overall population. Three quarters of respondents originally came from villages and towns with less than 100 ths. residents.

Some 28.5% respondents were below 20 years of age and another one third between 20 and 22 years. The majority of respondents were educated to a level above high-school (70%). Most of the young migrants (68%) planned to stay in Almaty for the next five years.

This is not saying that all of the Almaty young migrants are well educated. As noted in the beginning of this report, migrants from the most vulnerable groups refused to take part in the survey and would not answer interviewers’ questions.

Three quarters of respondents had never been married, while 21.4% were officially married. Some of the respondents were living with their partners in common-law marriage, others were divorced or separated from their spouses. Some 43% of respondents live in Almaty together with family members, and 93% of this group live with relatives aged between 18 and 30 years.

3.2. Reasons for the move

What drove the respondents to move to Almaty? This was a multiple answer question. 57.4% chose ‘continuing education’, 54.1% - ‘insufficient income’. 43.4% respondents selected ‘no job/income at my previous place of residence’, 31.8% - ‘I was unsatisfied with the quality of life’, 21.5% - ‘family reasons’. ‘Lack of quality health care’ was ‘very important’ for 1.5% respondents and ‘significant’ for 3.3% - a factor that led the total of 4.8% respondents to move to Almaty.

57 These questions were separated after the questionnaire was tested at the start of the research. In course of test survey, some respondents indicated that they are believers who are not affiliated with any traditional religion or engaged in any worship. These respondents identified themselves as Tengri believers.
A 22-year old girl came from the town of Arkalyk in Kostanai oblast. Her 26-year old brother was very sick and needed constant medical care. All the family (mother, father and two siblings) had to move. At present they rent 2 rooms in an apartment in the Shanyrak microdistrict. They are registered in the town of Talgar at their relatives’ address. (Translated from Kazakh).

Chart 9. Reasons for moving to Almaty

Source: Youth migration database

As far as gender is concerned, female respondents tended to describe social reasons as the most important reason for moving to Almaty, including education, health care, family concerns and support from relatives and friends. Male migrants found economic reasons more compelling, including insufficient income and low living standards in their original place of residence.

The duration of migrants’ stay in Almaty differs by age group. Older respondents have lived in Almaty longer.

Chart 10. Length of residence in Almaty

Source: Youth migration database
Some 11.5% of youth migrants live in Almaty for less than one year, and 77.4% of this group were born between 1990 and 1994 (Chart 10, Table 2). Some 71.5% of respondents that lived in Almaty for anywhere from 1 and 3 years, were born in 1991-1999. Among the respondents that reside in Almaty for more than 3 years, but less than 5 years, 72.3% were born in 1987-1991. The majority of those who reside in Almaty for more than 10 years were born in 1984-1988 (73.0%).

**Table 2. Correlation between the respondents age and the length of their residence in Almaty**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How long have you lived in Almaty</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1 year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1988</td>
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<td>1989</td>
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<td>1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Итого</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusions

Almaty attracts young migrants seeking jobs, stable incomes and education. Some 57.8% of respondent moved to Almaty for education, 45.1% – because of low income at their previous residence, 43.4% - due to job shortages, 31.8% because of dissatisfaction with the quality of their lives and 21.5% - for family reasons.

Gender differences were as follows: social reasons had more importance for women while economic reasons were compelling for men.

Only 6.4% respondents had lived in Almaty for over 10 years, 11.5% had been here for less than one year, and the remaining group equally divides into those who lived in Almaty between 1 and 3, 3 and 5, and 5 and 10 years.

**3.3. Living conditions and registration**

Only 9.7% of respondents owned an apartment or house where they lived by themselves or with relatives. Some 18.6% respondents lived in student residencies, 54.3% rented rooms (with 4-5 roommates) or houses in the outskirts of the city (2-3 families in one house). Some 15.4% respondents lived with relatives, 2% of respondents lived ‘at work’ – for instance at gas stations.
There is no obvious correlation between a migrant’s age and living conditions, except for the students born in 1987-1994, the majority of whom live in dormitories (Table 3). A smaller number of students own houses, rent rooms or live with relatives.

**Chart 11. Migrants’ living conditions**

![Chart showing living conditions](image)

*Source: Youth migration database*

Salaried workers are another significant group with consistent pattern related to access to housing. Respondents who own housing or have no problems with accommodation have a greater chance of finding work and stable incomes. Some 42.3% of house owners (41 respondent) and 57.1% of respondents living in rented apartments (310 persons) were employed. Some 43.5% of salaried workers (67 respondents) lived with relatives.

**Table 3. Correlation between age and living conditions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>In my own house</th>
<th>Rent an apartment</th>
<th>With my relatives</th>
<th>At the student residency</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Youth migration database*

**Registration**

Some 45.8 % respondents were registered in Almaty, while 54.2% had no registration. At the same time only 12.5% of respondents were registered at their actual place of residence in Almaty. Some 18.3% young migrants had temporary registration at student residencies while 50.9% of
respondents were registered at their previous residences or in a different location altogether. Some 15% of respondents had paid for registration (illegally) or were registered at the addresses of friends for employment purposes. Another 0.2% of respondents were registered at their place of work. During the survey respondents said a six-month registration certificate can be bought under the table for 200-300 USD in Almaty. Respondents gave the following reasons for solving registration problems by buying necessary documents illegally: ‘I needed access to child benefits’, ‘I wasn’t able to enroll my child at kindergarten without registration’ and so on.

**Chart 12. Registration**

![Chart showing registration statistics](image)

*Source: Youth migration database*

When asked ‘Are members of your family registered together with you at your place of residence?’ 25.5% replied ‘yes’ and 74.5% – ‘no’.

Respondents living in Almaty without registration gave the following reasons for failing to obtain documents: ‘I don’t own any property in Almaty’ (52.4%), ‘registration is not necessary’ (34.3%), ‘bureaucratic obstacles’ (8.9%), ‘I don’t have rights to register at property I live in’ (1.4%) and other (Chart.13)

**Chart 13. Reasons for failure to register in Almaty**

![Chart showing reasons for failure to register](image)

*Source: Youth migration database*
Conclusions

Over half of young migrants that participated in the survey said they lived in rented apartments or houses with 4-5 roommates or several families in one house. Less than 10% of respondents live with their family in an apartment or house that they own. Residents of student dorms only have temporary registration. There are not enough dorms to accommodate all students. Some 15.4% of respondents lived with their relatives and 2% at their place of work in car service stations. Migrants who have no housing problems have a better chance of finding work.

Some 45.8% of respondents were registered in Almaty, but only 12.5% lived at the address where they were registered. Some 15% had paid under the table to obtain registration documents needed for employment, child benefits, access to kindergartens and other.

Over half of young migrants are registered not in Almaty, but at their former place of residence either in other cities or rural areas. This means that their relocation to Almaty is not reflected in official internal migration statistics. Migrants without registration cannot obtain unemployed status, attend training courses for the unemployed or participate in social programs such as Youth Internship programs. The main reason migrants fail to register is, according to respondents, their lack of access to housing or limited opportunities for registration.

3.4. Access to services

Respondents said access to some services, such as electric power and gas supply was adequate. Only 1.4% said they had no access to these services. Some 2.5% of respondents complained about lack of access to the water mains, 6.3% said they had limited access to public transport, 11% said there were no markets in the vicinity of their residences.

Some 91% of respondents said child care or the lack thereof was an acute problem. These are some of the answers respondents gave to questions about access to child care: “Kindergarten is expensive (25 ths. KZT per month), plus a one-off payment of 200 USD. Young families do not get any financial aid”. “I have three kids and I had to pay 250 and 200 USD to enroll the two eldest ones at kindergarten. My youngest daughter is 3 and I take her to work with me. I can enroll my daughter at kindergarten when my eldest son starts school. I would need 200 USD more for that”. “I am on the kindergarten waiting-list. Once I met the director and gave her 30 ths. KZT for each of my children. She added us to the list and promised to call once a place becomes available”. “I need 400 USD to enroll 2 kids (4 and 2.5 years) at kindergarten. I have agreed to pay this sum, so now I am saving money”. (Translated from Kazakh).

Chart 14. Access of migrants to services in Almaty

Source: Youth migration database
Access to health care services

Some 43.7% respondents said that they did not seek medical help when they fell ill while 56.3% sought medical help. Some 50.5% of those visiting the doctor attended private clinics, 28.6% - public out-patient clinics according to their place of residence, 24% – the clinic for university students, 5% – doctors they knew personally and 1.6% called an ambulance.

The accessibility of health care services for young migrants depends to some extent on their employment status (Table 4). As in the case of housing, salaried workers and students are better placed to obtain access to health care. They have more opportunities to use the out-patient clinics in the vicinity to their place of residence (63 employees and 83 students), since they are more likely to live in a house they own. This group of respondents also use private clinics more frequently (158 employees and 69 students) and are more likely to go to doctors they know personally. Health care services are more accessible to salaried workers because of their stable income, while the situation is different for the self-employed and entrepreneurs.

At present, students are more likely to come from better off families that share certain values (such as an aspiration for knowledge and an interest in educating children). These values are often associated with other advantages such as home ownership, accessibility of health care and other services. Students can attend student out-patient clinics even if they are not registered in Almaty. However, they cannot afford private medical care and have no right to attend clinics at their place of residence. Some employed student respondents indicated that in some cases they sought treatment at student clinics.

Table 4. Correlation between access to medical services and employment status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Status</th>
<th>Out-patient clinic at the place of residence</th>
<th>Student clinic</th>
<th>Paid clinic</th>
<th>Went to see doctors they know personally</th>
<th>Ambulance /emergency medical care</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed entrepreneur</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector employee</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector employee</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid domestic worker</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On maternity leave</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Youth migration database

Respondents were dissatisfied with access to medical services. “The quality of public health care is low and private health care is expensive’, many, particularly women, said.

Respondents that chose not to seek medical help (Chart.15) explained that ‘there was no need’ (47.4%), ‘they prefer self-treatment’ (41.0%) or that they visited a doctor outside Almaty in their place of registration (4.9%). Respondents also gave other reasons such as ‘lack of registration’ (4.1%), ‘lack of funds to pay for private medical care’ (4.1%) or that ‘clinics are located too far away from place of residence” (1.6%).
Access to education

Replying to a question about the availability of education services, 70.6% of respondents said they had no access while 29.4% said, yes, they had access to education services. Out of 706 young migrants who answered ‘yes’ to this question, 280 had graduated from college or university, 217 were studying with their tuition fees paid by parents or relatives, 164 had received public education grants and 20 were studying off-campus and paying their tuition fees themselves. Some 17 respondents had received other types of grants, including from the US - Central Asia Education Foundation, the Tatishev Foundation, the Saudi Center and grants named after Nazarbaev. Eight young migrants had received help from other sources in financing their education.
Respondents who commented on their lack of access to education gave reasons such as low income (‘me/my family cannot afford it’ – 75.9%). Some 10.2% felt no need for further education, 4.8% did not have time, 3.8% dropped out because they had run out of money, 1.4% had health issues preventing them from studying, and 3.8% believed they lacked the necessary level of knowledge to go back to school.

**Chart 17. Reasons for lack of access to education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low income</td>
<td>75.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No need for further education</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No time for education</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money ran out</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health issues</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lacked necessary level</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Youth migration database

One respondent who ticked “no need for further education” gave the following commentary with her answer:

*Girl, 24 years of age, arrived from Maiynkum village in Zhambyl oblast, works as a vendor in a shop. “Some of my friends paid for their education and could not find jobs after graduation. They were unemployed for some time. Nobody wanted to hire them without job experience. If they got offers it was for a ‘trial period’ where they fire you after six months of unpaid work when you are no longer needed. As a result, all of them have started working in shops’ (Translation from Kazakh).*

**Access to financial services**

When answering the question ‘Do you have access to financial services (such as loans, credit, health or property insurance)?’, 23.2% respondents said ‘yes’ and 76.8% ‘no’.

Some 12.4% of respondents received micro-loans, 12.5% used formal financial services (multiple answers questions). Respondents also answered ‘yes’ in cases where their father or spouse had applied for the loan.

*28-year old woman, married, has an 8-month old child. Arrived from Ust-Kamenogorsk. She is working as a fruit and vegetables seller in a shop owned by her family. Her father has an individual entrepreneur certificate. He was also the sole applicant for a banking loan that is now being repaid by all of the family members. The family has built a house in the outskirts of Almaty. This respondent graduated from the Physics and Mathematics Department of the Ust-Kamenogorsk University. Worked as a private school teacher. It was difficult to make ends meet with her small salary, so she had to quit her job and move to Almaty to work with her father.*
When asked ‘Do you have a bank account?’ 43.0% respondents said ‘yes’ and 57.0% - ‘no’.

Is there a correlation between having a banking account and employment status? Salaried workers and students accounted for the majority of respondents that used banking services. Some 65.3% of respondents that used banking services were students and 32.3% salaried workers (Chart 5). The explanation for this is that salaries and stipends are usually paid into bank accounts.

Table 5. Correlation between employment status and banking accounts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you have a banking account</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneur</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector employee</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector employee</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid domestic worker</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On maternity leave</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Youth migration database

When answering the question “Why do you have no banking account?” (multiple answer question) 78.3% respondents replied ‘I do not need a banking account’, 15.1% – ‘I have no money to put into the account’, 2.5% – ‘I do not trust banks’, other respondents gave other reasons (Chart 18).

Chart 18. Reasons for lack of access to banking services

Source: Youth migration database
Conclusions

Some 83.5% of young migrants with children commented on the lack of access to kindergartens. The majority of respondents had access to electric power and water supply, public transportation and markets. Some 16.5% of respondents managed to enroll their children at kindergartens, but many of them had to resort to questionable measures, including bribing kindergarten administration or buying registration certificates to obtain places.

Over half of respondents used medical services in Almaty. Just over half of those who needed medical assistance (50.3%) attended paid clinics, 28.6% – public out-patient clinic according to their place of residence and 24% – student clinics.

The majority of respondents had access to education. Some 29.4% were without access, and 75.9% of them said they could not afford education. Just 3.8% replied that they lacked the knowledge needed to enroll in school.

Over half of young migrants have no bank accounts, even though Amaty is a hub for most of country’s banks. This information should prompt the Kazakh financial regulator to give more attention to extending banking services to all segments of the population. A very large 93.4% of this groups of respondents explained that they did not have enough money to justify opening a bank account.

Salaried workers and students accounted for the majority of those who had bank accounts. Only 12.4% of respondents had taken out bank loans and 12.5% had used other financial services.

3.5. Employment, income and remittances

The Almaty Department of Statistics estimated that the unemployment rate was 6.6% for young people aged 15-24 years in 2011. If the number of young people out of work in the 25 - to 29 year age group was added, the unemployment rate in the city would average 6.9% in 2011.

These statistics do not reflect the real situation on the ground as they only include the unemployed registered at the Employment Center. Registering at the Employment Center is only possible for Almaty residents holding valid permits to live in the city. Young migrants who have not registered as city residents cannot be registered as unemployed.

Respondents could choose several answers when replying to questions about employment. Some 44.7% of young migrants ticked the ‘employed’ box, and the majority of them said they worked in cafés and restaurants, beauty salons, car wash and the like or as vendors. Some of these workers also had jobs on side and earned extra cash from multi-level-marketing, or as drivers, part-time accountants and so on. Some respondents also combined work with studying on or off-campus. Students topped up their income by giving foreign or Kazakh language lessons, tutoring, standing in for their relatives at market stalls on week-ends, (basically being self-employed.)

In total, 16.9% of respondents said that they were self-employed, 5.9% respondents – unemployed, 3.7% - unpaid domestic workers, 2.2% - public sector employees, 1.3% - housewives, 0.6% were on maternity leave.
Few young migrants are involved in entrepreneurial activities and only 3.8% respondents possessed individual entrepreneurship certificates or patents, required to engage in such activities. Often the parents or other relatives of respondents held entrepreneurship certificates while they themselves rented market stalls selling drinks, fruit and vegetables and the like.

When replying to the question ‘Who helped you get a job” 50.8% of respondents indicated they found jobs on their own, 48.1% – with the help of relatives and friends, 0.5% – via a private employment agency and just 0.2% – with the help of the public employment office.

Respondents asked why they were out of work explained that they “cannot find a job in their field” – 66.2%, ‘lack working experience’– 60.0%, ‘lack relevant qualifications’ – 15.4% and ‘have no registration’– 7.7% (respondents could chose multiple answers).

When respondents described themselves as unemployed, they meant they had no job opportunities rather than they were registered as unemployed by a state agency. None of unemployed respondents had registered as out of work at the Almaty Employment Center, because registration is only open to people holding residency permits in the city.

**Registration of unemployed citizens**

**Unemployed** – are working age persons that are not involved in income-generating work for reasons beyond their control, and are available and willing to work.

**Job seekers** can apply to the authorized body for employment assistance according to their place of residence.

The authorized body decides the unemployment status of job seekers who are required to submit the following documents:

1. identification card (passport)
2. documents that confirm their job history
3. social individual code certificate
4. taxpayer registration number

Job-seekers shall also provide information about their income (of declarative nature).

In less than ten days after the receipt of these documents the authorized body shall register applicants as unemployed in accordance with their place of residence.
Unemployed who were registered with the authorized agency shall report to the authorized agency at least once every ten days, while unemployed residing in rural areas shall report to the village/village district akims no less than once a month.

Out of 640 employed respondents just 30.8% were formally employed (20.3% of all respondents) and were in possession of a labor contract. Some 335 respondents were working in accordance with a verbal contract, 52 worked within a registered small or medium business enterprise (some of them work with their family members who have a patent or individual business certificate), 48 worked for no financial reward (unpaid domestic workers).

When asked “Why are you not formally employed?”, 36.5% of respondents replied that they were freelancing, 24.1% - that they were working under informal contracts with employers who could pay them higher salaries off the books, 25.1% - that they were doing casual work, 12.4% said their employers chose not to register them, 1.5% - that informal employment was ‘more convenient for the employer’.

Some 42.5% out of 1,000 respondents had pension savings contracts while 57.5% had no contracts with pension funds. Employers only made mandatory pension payments for respondents that were formally employed (20.3% of the total sample). Just 2.9% of respondents were making voluntary pension contributions.

Income

The monthly income of the respondent/household (if married) includes all wages, salaries, pensions and other income of family members living under one roof.

Employment was cited as the main source of income by 49.6% of the respondents polled. Some 38.6% of respondents said they received sizable financial assistance from their relatives, 18.1% generated income from self-employed activities, 15.0% received student allowances, 5.1% cited their spouse’s income as an important source of income. Benefits, social assistance and pensions were mentioned in 2%, 0.2% and 0.3% of answers correspondingly.

Chart 20. Sources of income

| Source: Youth migration database |

Over half of young migrants (57.1%) have monthly incomes of less than 55 ths. tenge. The largest group of respondents (17.7%) said they receive between 45 - to 55 ths. tenge a month.
In determining the correlation between incomes and education levels we calculated the highest average income of respondents from each of the education groups (Table 2 in Appendix).

Young migrants with high school certificates (incomplete high school education) can expect to be paid anywhere from 35 to 45 ts. tenge per month – the monthly income range received by 25% of respondents from this group. Those migrants with high school diplomas income (24.8% respondents) and those with secondary education degree earned (substantially more) between 45 - 55 ts. tenge per month.

The same pattern of income distribution was seen among respondents with varying levels of vocational training. Those who had not completed their course of studies (21.2% of respondents in this group) received salaries of between 25 - 35 ts. tenge a month. Skilled professionals with a vocational college (20.7% of the group) degree reported higher incomes between 55 ts. to 65 ts. tenge.

Some 19% of respondents still studying for a higher education degree, received incomes of 35 - 45 ts. tenge per month. Out of those who already had a first degree, 19.2% earned 75 ts. - 85 ts. tenge. This extreme difference can be explained by the fact that students only work part-time and therefore earn much less than they might if in full time employment.

Respondents’ income levels directly reflected their education level.

Some 13.2% of university graduates, 2.3% of respondents with high school certificate, 7.2% with high school diploma and 1.5% respondents with incomplete vocational school degrees, earned 85 ts. - 95 ts. tenge per month.

A further 13.2 per cent of university graduates, 3.8% of respondents with high school certificate, 4.5% - with vocation qualifications and 7.6% - with incomplete vocational degree earned 95 – 200 ts. tenge a month.

Some respondents reported monthly incomes below minimum subsistence level of 17,439 tenge. These were mainly students (33 respondents), largely dependent on student allowances that average a meager 7,000 tenge for college and 15,000 tenge for university students. Student allowances were the main source of income for respondents from families with many children who are dependent on financial assistance throughout their training and live in student residences. Another 13 respondents who reported sub-subsistence level incomes were either private sector employees, self-employed, unpaid domestic workers or unemployed.
Monthly incomes of less than 25 ths. tenge were most prevalent among students (79 respondents). Like the sub-subsistence income group mentioned above, these were young people living in student residencies and receiving student allowances and other financial aid. However, they also received financial support from parents and relatives to the tune of 10-15 ths tenge a month. Other respondents (31 in all) who reported similar income levels were either unemployed, self-employed or private sector employees.

The below 35 ths tenge income group included students (95 respondents) that received both student allowance and financial support from parents; they lived in student dorms or rented apartments with friends. This group also includes some unemployed, self-employed and salaried workers, a public sector employee and a woman on maternity leave.

The group reporting incomes below 45 ths. tenge a month included students (72), but also had higher share of private sector employees (59) and self-employed respondents (29). As in other relatively well off groups, students received financial support both from the state and their parents. Most salaried employees in this group were educated at high school level and worked as market vendors, ticket inspectors on buses or assistants to relatives who owned market stalls and shops. They were employed under special tax conditions applicable to patent holders (for bus drivers) or owners of small businesses. Respondents from this group usually had only a verbal contract with their employers. The self-employed in this group were involved in a wide range of activities: goods delivery, balloon sales, babysitting for family and friends, or selling newspapers or fruit at railway stations, amusement parks or near shopping malls. They worked on an unofficial basis. Some respondents in this group include unemployed and unpaid domestic workers.

Respondents reporting monthly incomes in the 45-55 ths. tenge range were mostly private sector employees (101), or students (66), plus some self-employed and unemployed migrants. This group mainly included employed respondents with higher education or vocational degrees who had not found jobs in their specific field. Instead they were working in the food industry, or as salespeople in major malls and trade centers (CDS, MEGA, Karkara). Most were formally employed (with pension deductions) or at least had written contracts that specified their net salary.

The monthly income of students receiving education grants, (e.g. from the US-CA Education Foundation or Tatishev Foundation), included additional financial assistance from parents/relatives.

The group reporting monthly incomes of 55 to 75 ths. tenge, included private sector workers (83 respondents), students that worked part-time and received allowance (32), self-employed (25) and others. Employees in this group were working as freight handlers, security guards, waiters, managers and salespersons in malls. Some worked at service stations.

Respondents reporting monthly incomes in excess of 75 ths. tenge mainly worked for private companies, at beauty salons, or as accountants, managers and other professions. Some members of this income group worked with relatives/friends (parents, spouses) that rent market stalls and operate under special tax conditions (driver patents or individual entrepreneur certificates). This group also includes students who work part-time.

Remittances

More than one third of respondents (33.1%) said they had ‘sent money to their relatives in 2011’. Remittances had been sent by respondents from a wide range of income groups and included employees, self-employed and unemployed, and also students. Salaried workers sent money to their relatives more frequently than other groups (Table 6).
Table 6. Money senders by employment status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment status</th>
<th>Did you send money to your relatives over 2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneur</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector employee</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector employee</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid domestic worker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On maternity leave</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>669</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Young migrants from the entire 18 years - 29 year age group sent money home. Respondents born between 1984 and 1990 were slightly more likely to send remittances.

As for education levels, migrants with second degrees (43.2%) sent money home the most frequently, followed by migrants with a first degree (21.8%) and vocational school graduates (13.9%).

Although migrants earn low incomes incommensurate with the high cost of living in Almaty, remittances they send home are often the only source of finance for their families. Among respondents sending money to their families, 22.4% reported monthly incomes between 45 and 55 tenge, 18.4% - 55-65 tenge, 15.7% - 65-75 tenge.

Some respondents said they had left their small children behind with grandparents in the village (because of the lack of access to Almaty kindergartens) and were sending home 35-40 tenge a month in child support. Others needed money to pay their family’s medical bills (e.g. father of one of the respondents needed 1,700 tenge for hip replacement surgery). Some had borrowed from relatives to cover health care or funeral expenses and were in the process of paying back debt.

A 28-year old woman moved to Almaty from Aktobe. She works at a private dressmaker’s shop and earns a monthly wage of 60 tenge. Her husband works a 15 day rotation shifts in Kyzyl-Orda (10 days off per month). He earns 80 tenge a month. In 2010 the young family borrowed 300 tenge to pay for mother’s funeral and continued to repay this debt throughout 2011 (Translated from Kazakh).

Some 35.3% of respondents polled in the survey sent up to 100 tenge a year home in remittances, 34.7% sent up to 200 tenge, 18% up to 300 tenge and 6.3% more than 500 tenge a year.
Some 410 of respondents, representing all groups except for housewives and women on maternity leave, received money from their families in 2011. Respondents with a monthly income of less than 55 thousand tenge received 80.9% of all remittances. The majority of those receiving remittances were students who accounted for more than two thirds of the funds sent by relatives to migrants in Almaty (Chart 7).

**Table 7. Education of migrants receiving remittances**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education level</th>
<th>Have you received money from your relatives in 2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete 9 grades</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete 9 grades (high school certificate)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete high school</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete high school (diploma)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete vocational college</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational degree</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete higher education</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education degree</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>410</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Youth migration database

Those receiving remittances also included salaried workers, self-employed and unemployed respondents and unpaid domestic workers. Migrants in receipt of remittances usually used the
funds to pay for health care, driving courses or to make down payments at work - for instance to rent a shop.

Young migrants on low incomes were more likely to receive money from their relatives than send remittances home. The majority of respondents with incomes at, or below 17,439 (the minimum subsistence level) to - 45 ths. tenge said they received financial support from relatives (Chart 8).

Table 8. Income and remittance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly income (tenge)</th>
<th>Have you received money from your relatives in 2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>below 17,439</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17,459 – 25,000</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25,000 – 35,000</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35,000 – 45,000</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45,000 – 55,000</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55,000 – 65,000</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65,000 – 70,000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75,000 -85,000</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85,000 – 95,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95,000-200,000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Youth migration database

One third of young migrants received up to 100 ths. tenge a year of remittances, 22.6% up to 200 ths. tenge and 15.8% up to 300 ths. tenge.

Chart 23. Average annual incoming remittances in 2011
Source: Youth migration database

Migrants used incoming remittances to pay for food (87.3%), rent (81.8%), tuition (46.6% - the amount varying depending on whether student also received grants) and other expenses (3.9%).

Chart 24. Purpose of incoming remittances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>87.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living expenses</td>
<td>81.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>46.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Youth migration database

Conclusions

Some 44.7% of respondents were employed in the private sector. However, only 20.3% of employed respondents had employment contracts that included provision for pension deductions. More than one third of respondents - or 33.5% - only had verbal contracts with their employers and 5% had no formal agreements with employers at all.

Almaty public and private employment agencies do not provide special services for the vulnerable young migrants segment. When asked how they had found jobs in Almaty, just 3 out of 640 employed respondents said they had used a private employment agency. Only one respondent had used the public employment office. In all, 326 respondents had found jobs on their own while a further 308 respondents had asked relatives or friends for help.

Only 3.8% respondents have patents or individual entrepreneurship certificates.

Some 57.1% of respondents received incomes below 55 tns. tenge per month. Young migrants’ incomes in Almaty are calculated on the basis of salaries, assistance from family, earnings from self-employment and student allowances. In general the higher the migrant’s education level, the higher the income level.

Some 33.1% of respondents said they sent money home to their family despite their modest incomes and the high cost of living in Almaty. Remittances were often the only source of income for the families of this group of young migrants.

Some 41% respondents - mostly students - received financial help from their relatives who sent money to help pay for the cost of food, rent and tuition in Almaty.

3.6. Social status

The question: ‘Do you or any member of your family receive social assistance and/or welfare benefits?’ was used to determine the social status of respondents. The question covered all family members including those living in Almaty and elsewhere. Some 26.0% respondents ticked the ‘yes’ box while the remaining 74.0% said they and their families lived without social benefits.
Those who answered ‘yes’ were asked to give details about the type of benefits or aid received. More than half - 53.1% - of respondents to this question said their family members received pensions, 16.4% mentioned child benefits and 30.9% – other benefits.

**Chart 25. Social assistance and welfare benefits received by the family members**

Source: Youth migration database

Among the respondents whose families received welfare assistance, 50% were students, 39.2% - salaried workers and 18.8% were self-employed. Some 50% of respondents whose families received welfare assistance were born in 1990-1993 (these answers correlate with data on students)

**Table 9. Correlation between age of respondents and social assistance to their family members**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of birth of the respondent</th>
<th>Do you or members of your family receive social assistance</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 983</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 984</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 985</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 986</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 987</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 988</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 989</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 990</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 991</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 992</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 993</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 994</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 995</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 996</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 998</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Youth migration database

The overwhelming majority (92.3%) of the 74% survey respondents, who did not receive welfare benefits, said they did not qualify for support. Some 3.1% did not know what kinds of benefits
were available, and 2.1% believed that applying for welfare required filling out too many forms. Remaining respondents cited other reasons for not applying for welfare benefits. (Chart 26).

Chart 26. Reasons for not applying for social assistance/welfare

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>you do not qualify for welfare benefits</td>
<td>92.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>you are not a citizen</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>you have no registration</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>too many documents are needed</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>you have difficulties with obtaining necessary documents</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>you do not know how and where to apply</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>you are aware but you are not registered in Almaty and benefits are not available</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>you are not aware of benefits</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other reasons</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Youth migration database

In answer to the question ‘What are the three most important priorities/issues for you or your family?’ (multiple answers possible) respondents replied (Chart 27):

- housing – 67.4%;
- employment and, consequently, stable income – 53%;
- education/access to education – 36.1%.

One respondent complained that “Government’s programs, e.g. ‘Auyl’, are poorly implemented”. A young man whose family had immigrated from China said that “finding a job is difficult for those who do not speak Russian”.
Some 8% of respondents were reluctant to answer questions about the problems they faced. This group included migrants from different income groups. For example, here are some of the answers from respondents with monthly incomes below 25 ths. tenge:

- I do not know (mostly freshman and sophomore students who receive student allowances);
- Welfare assistance of 8,000 tenge a month is not enough for families with many children;
- Student allowance is too low (7,000 tenge);
- A single mother has 4 children and needs social aid;
- Father is not paying child support.

Respondents with monthly incomes below 35 ths. tenge who said they ‘would like to get an education grant’, noted a ‘shortage of student dormitories’, and complained about ‘expensive public transportation costs and the lack of student benefits’.

**Conclusions**

One in four out of 1,000 respondents to the survey said their families received social aid or welfare benefits. Over half of these specified pensions as the type of benefit received. Half of respondents in this group were students. The lion’s share (92.3%) of respondents with families said they did not receive any social assistance and believed they did not qualify for welfare benefits. Another 3.1% were not aware of the types of social aid available to them and 2.1% singled out the bureaucracy as an obstacle to receiving welfare.

Problems that most concern young migrants in Almaty include housing, employment and access to education.

**3.7. Social and political activity**

Survey respondents were asked to specify the types of socially-based organizations with which they were actively engaged from a list that included church/mosques, as well as sports, arts, music, education, culture, recreational or charity organizations. Socially-based engagement was assessed according to the number of organizations respondents were involved with and the scope of their activities. The survey also examined respondents’ engagement with trade unions, political parties, professional associations and consumer and environmental organizations. Involvement in these organizations was seen as an indicator of political engagement.
**Scope and depth of socially-based engagement**

More than one fifth (22.7%) of respondents were ‘actively’ involved in socially-oriented organizations, such as mosque/church, sports, recreation, arts, music, culture or charity groups. Some 6.3% respondents were ‘active’ in more than one socially-oriented organization (these were mostly students involved in sports and music).

Some 23.5% of respondents regularly (weekly, bi-monthly, monthly or several times a year) attended sport clubs, volunteered or participated in activities of sport groups (rooted for sports teams, played football).

Some 11.7% of respondents said they were volunteers at least one socially-oriented organization and 1.7% of this group were volunteers at more than one organization (usually students involved in sports, music, culture or charity groups).

Some 9.6% young migrants spent time on sports or volunteer work at least once a month.

**Table 10. Scope and depth of socially-based engagement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.1</th>
<th>Scope of socially-based engagement</th>
<th>19.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1.1</td>
<td>Involvement in socially oriented organizations</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.2</td>
<td>Volunteering for socially oriented organizations</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.3</td>
<td>Involvement in local communities</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Depth of socially-based engagement</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1</td>
<td>Participation in more than one socially oriented organization</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.2</td>
<td>Volunteering for more than one socially oriented organization</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.3</td>
<td>Involvement in local community events at least once a month</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Youth migration database*

**Scope and depth of political engagement**

The scope and depth of young migrants’ political engagement was measured using data about respondents’ political activities (signing petitions and participating in strikes or mass meetings) as well their involvement in politically-oriented organizations such as trade unions, political parties, professional, consumer and/or environmental groups.

Some 9.7% of respondents were involved in the activities of one politically-oriented organization and just 2.2% in the activities of more than one such organization.

Some 3.9% had volunteered in at least one politically-oriented organization, while 0.5% had volunteered for more than one such organizations (for example, the student trade union or youth wing of the Nur Otan party).

Over the past five years, 7.0% respondents had signed petitions and/or participated in strikes and/or mass meetings. Only 0.3% had engaged in all of these activities during the same period. Some 54.7% of young migrants said that they would never sign petitions, 64.4% would never go on strike, and 63% would never take part in a mass meeting. To put this data in perspective, the poll of political activity levels in the general population carried out for the *Civil Society Index*, revealed that almost two thirds of respondents (63.8%) would never sign petitions, 74.8% would never go on strike, and 58.1% would never attend a mass meeting. These answers can be explained by the legislative restrictions that apply to peaceful assemblies and meetings.

Young people are more active only when it comes to signing petitions, otherwise the results of two surveys are quite similar. As in *Civil Society Index* young people are more involved in socially-based rather than political activities.

Students are generally the most politically active group, particularly dormitory supervisors, student union or maslikhat members and Zhas Otan members. Some of 3.1% respondents had participated in environmental organizations and 2.5% (25 people in all) had volunteered for environmental organizations.

Political activity of non-student respondents comes to being members of Nur Otan. These respondents reported that they had registered as party members while still at university. Only 5.0% of all respondents belonged to a political party, 95.0% of respondents were politically uncommitted.

Table 11. Scope and depth of political engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.4</th>
<th>Scope of political participation</th>
<th>6.9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.4.1</td>
<td>Involvement in politically oriented organization</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.2</td>
<td>Volunteering for politically oriented organization</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.3</td>
<td>Civic activity</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Depth of political participation</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5.1</td>
<td>Involvement in more than one politically oriented organization</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5.2</td>
<td>Volunteering for more than one politically oriented organization</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5.3</td>
<td>Involvement in different types of political activity</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Youth migration database

Trust

Civil Society Index survey allowed evaluating the socio-cultural context, including the level of trust in the society. Here trust is viewed as the country’s social capital. Trust, according to Fukuyama, is the ‘cultural key to prosperity’, and countries with low level of trust have limited economic potential. Just 18.5% of respondents (sampled from all age groups) surveyed within the framework of the Civil Society Index believed that people could be trusted.

During our research we asked young migrants the following question, ‘According to you, can people be trusted or does one have to be wary of others?”. Only 21.6% respondents replied that people could be trusted, while 78.8% recommended caution. Young migrants seem to be slightly more trusting towards others than the rest of the population. This relative openness can be explained by their age. Generally, the level of trust among the respondents was very low.

Our hypothesis on the higher level trust among better educated people has proved to be unfounded (Chart 13). Respondents with incomplete higher education, mainly students, demonstrate slightly higher level of trust (45.8% of all respondents who spoke in favour of trust as opposed to 31.1% of those who believe in caution). However, the number of non-trusting respondents is higher for all groups, meaning that among the surveyed students 99 trust and 244 do not trust other people.

Trust is essentially linked to family values, lifestyle, cultural tradition and values.

Table 12. Level of trust depending on level of education

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of education</th>
<th>Can people be trusted</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Better be cautious</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incomplete 9 grades</td>
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<td>2.3%</td>
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59 Ibid
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<tr>
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<th>Complete High School (Diploma)</th>
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<th>Vocational Degree</th>
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<td>16.2%</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>231</td>
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<td>266</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>343</td>
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<tr>
<td>17.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>216</strong></td>
<td><strong>784</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Youth migration database

Confidence in institutions

Respondents’ level of confidence in the authorities and civil society was assessed on the basis of their answers to direct question about their trust in specific types of institution.

Mosques/churches topped the list of institutions most trusted by young migrants (57.9% respondents). But while the level of confidence in these religious organizations is high, the overall number of believers is much higher.

Respondents’ ranking of the most trusted institutions continued with the army (44.1% respondents) and TV (38.3% respondents) (Chart. 29) closely followed by the media/Internet, youth and charity organizations and the government with 33.3%.

The least trusted institutions included trade-unions (10.8% of respondents) and political parties (just 19%). Levels of trust among the young migrants are practically congruent with the results of the previous study among the general population60, except for one parameter: young migrants are twice less inclined to trust trade unions. In our view, this can be explained by the higher level of trust in trade unions among older population who remember the Soviet Union times when trade unions provided members with health benefits and holiday vouchers. The young generation are not exposed to trade union activities and, as a result, do not trust them.

Respondents also had low level of confidence in the police (20.7%) and in big companies (21.8%). Little more than 25% of respondents trusted parliament, the akimats/maslikhats, environmental organizations or courts.

Chart 28. Level of trust in government, public and civil society institutions

Source: Youth migration database

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60 Ibid
Communications

Only 1.4% respondents said that they did not own a cell phone, 98.6% had at least one cell phone. Some 22.3% of respondents said they had no access to the Internet. The remaining 77.7% of respondents had access to the Internet. Among those with access, 58.7% (455 persons) use the Internet daily, 23.5% - three and more times a week, 10.5% - once or twice a week, 5% - 2-3 times a months, 2.3% - once a month or less frequently.

Chart 29. Internet usage frequency

Source: Youth migration database

Some 50.8% of 455 daily users of the Internet were studying towards a first degree while 21.5% were university graduates. Among those who use the Internet three and more times a week (185 respondents), 39.5% were students, 25.9% – high school graduates, 15% had vocational qualifications, and 13% held a university degree.

Young migrants mainly use the Internet to access social networking sites (Facebook, VKontakte) – 87.3%, for work (studying) – 50.7%, to read the news – 36.2%, to look for a job – 8.9% and to do business – 5.2% (Chart 31).

Chart 30. Purposes of Internet use

Source: Youth migration database
How respondents spend their free time

*Every week* 39.5% of young migrants spend time with their parents/relatives (according to the survey, the majority of respondents share rented apartment with their siblings), 61.8% – with their friends, 36.0% - with colleagues (those who work), 6.7% – with people from their mosque, 7.0% – with fellow sports groups members, 8.8% – go to the movies and 2.9% – spend time in the nightclubs/coffeehouses (usually young people who work there).

*Once or twice a month* 19.3% of respondents spend time with their parents/relatives, 25.3% – with their friends, 7.2% – with people from their mosque/church, 40.8% – go to the movies and 13.3% – spend time in the nightclubs/coffeehouses.

*Just several times a year* 40.8% of young people spend time with their parents/relatives, 22.3% – go to the movies, 7.0% – with people from their mosque/church, 28.1% – attend concerts and 25.5% – spend time in the nightclubs/coffeehouses.

*Never spend their free time:* with colleagues – 46.0%; with people from their mosque/church – 79.1%; with their sports groups members– 76.5%. Young migrants do not have a lot of time to spare for cultural activities: 69.1% never go to theatres, 59% – to the concerts, and 22.3% – never go to the movies.

**Chart 31. How young migrants spend their free time**

![Chart showing the frequency of different activities]

*Source: Youth migration database*

**Conclusions**

Young migrants are more socially than politically active. 22.7% respondents are involved in activity of socially oriented organizations and only 2.2% participate in political organizations. 11.7% volunteer for socially oriented organizations, and 3.9% – for politically oriented organizations.

Civil activity is reduced to signing petitions and/or participating in strikes and/or peaceful assemblies. Only 7.0% of respondents took part in similar events over the past five years with only 0.3% participating in all of the listed types of events. 54.7% respondents indicated that they would never sign petitions, 64.4% – would never go on strike and 63% – would never take part in a mass meeting.
Levels of trust, an indicator of social capital, are very low. Only 21.6% answered ‘yes’ to the question, “According to you, can people be trusted”. The low level of trust among young people is a deterrent to the country’s development. The level of confidence in the authorities and civil society institutions is also low. Over half of young migrants trust mosques/churches, but the overall number of believers is much higher. Some 44.1% trust the army and 38.3% trust TV. Respondents are least trusting of trade unions (10.8%), political parties (19%), police (20.7%) and big companies (21.8%). Just one third of respondents trust the government, youth and charity organizations, and only one in four trusts Parliament, environmental organizations, the courts and maslikhats.

Almost all of the respondents have cellular phones and 77.7% have Internet access. Over half use the Internet daily and another 25% use it three or more times a week. The majority of Internet users are students and respondents with university degree.

4. Conclusions and recommendations

International organizations, including the IMF, OECD, ILO are increasingly focusing on youth issues and calling on governments around the world to address challenges facing youths, learn their needs, and include them in developing youth policies, education and job creation schemes in order to decrease marginalization risks.

“A rising adolescent and youth share of the population signals increases in the productive capacity of an economy on a per capita basis in the years to come and the prospect of a demographic dividend, a time-limited window of opportunity for rapid income growth and poverty reduction. The window, which exists as long as the working-age share of the population is relatively high, also poses a risk of social and political instability in economies that fail to generate sufficient jobs”, says the IMF.61

The OECD studied the impact the crisis had on its member states and found that young people were affected more than any other group.62 In the first quarter of 2011, the unemployment rate for young people (aged 15 to 24) was 17.3% in the OECD area compared with 7% for adults (aged 25 and over). “But these data on youth unemployment paint only part of the picture of the difficulties young people are facing in the labor market”, the OECD experts say. More generally, youth who are neither in employment nor in education or training are a group at high risk of marginalization and exclusion from the labor market, especially the longer they remain outside the world of work. In the 4th quarter of 2010, this group accounted for 12.6% of all youth aged 15-24 in the 30 OECD countries, up from 10.6% in 2008. This represents 22.3 million young people, 14.6 million of whom were inactive and not studying, and 7.7 million of whom were unemployed. “Young people leaving school in the coming years are more likely to struggle to find work than previous generations”, the experts warn.

According to the ILO data 63 74.5 million youth were unemployed around the world in 2011, meaning that youth unemployment rate was at 12.6%. What can be done to address these challenges? “Stronger job creation is a key part of the solution but will not help all youth unless accompanied by other measures”, continues the OECD report. “First, policies must be put in place to overcome the long-term failure to give all youth a better start in the labor market. To start with, “preventative” measures must be taken to improve early childhood education and care, particularly for children from low-income families and disadvantaged

61 IMF, Finance & Development. March 2012
63 ILO (2012), Global Employment Trends for Youth 2012, p.14
backgrounds. To be fully effective, these measures need to be sustained through the period of compulsory schooling (emphasis added). This, in turn, will help minimize school drop outs”. “These measures need to be complemented by efforts to achieve a better match between the skills youth acquire at school and those needed in the labor market. Reducing skills mismatch requires greater responsiveness of education systems to changing skill needs and a strengthening of educational choice through, for example, better opportunities for vocational education and training”, the OECD experts suggest.

In terms of improving youth labor market outcomes, OECD suggests that governments facing pressures for fiscal consolidation should give priority to cost-effective interventions. Thus, policies should focus on the most disadvantaged, including the long-term unemployed and those at high risk of exclusion. “Job-search assistance programs have been found to be the most cost-effective early intervention for young people who are assessed as ready to work”. This means that young people need job orientation and counseling in high school, rather than after they have left for other cities like Almaty.

Programs used in Kazakhstan, i.e. Youth Internship, are based on the experience of other countries. The Global Employment Trends for Youth 2012 describes a similar program in Bulgaria where the government reacted to the crisis by launching a Youth Work Experience initiative that provides six-month grants to encourage employers to hire recent graduates. Unfortunately, the impact of Kazakhstan’s Youth Internship program is undermined by the fact that government reports on the number of candidates assigned to temporary rather than permanent positions.

“Some countries have also introduced wage subsidies to encourage employers to hire low-skilled unemployed youth. However, in order to avoid the deadweight effects entrenched in these subsidies, they should be adequately targeted, for example on small and medium-size enterprises or on apprenticeship contracts”, says the OECD.

“There may also be a need in many countries to expand opportunities for “study and work” programs such as apprenticeships and other dual vocational education and training programs”. This proposal resembles the Soviet vocational training programs that allowed high-school students to obtain professional skills and qualifications before graduation.

The OECD emphasizes that ‘more intensive, remedial, assistance should be targeted on those youth at greatest risk of social exclusion. While back-to-the-classroom strategies might prove counterproductive for them, training programs taught outside traditional schools, combined with regular exposure to work experience and adult mentoring, are often better strategies for these disconnected young people”.

“Investing in youth and giving them a better start in the world of work should be a key policy objective for long-term economic and social change”, this is the OECD’s overarching message.

“It is important that institutions, policymakers, and society as a whole really listen to what young people are saying. Communities, cities, provinces, and countries can set up forums for the purpose of listening to the concerns and ideas of adolescents and young adults and stimulating change. Young people could be offered a voice in decision-making bodies. To make such processes genuinely worthwhile means including individuals who represent poor or less-educated sectors of society. Inclusion can benefit all”, insists the IMF.64

Prompt attention to youth migration issues is a prerequisite for Kazakhstan’s economic growth. The results of this study and the recommendations from international institutions have provided a basis for a set of proposals for the development of a comprehensive youth migration policy. The

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64 IMF, Finance & Development, March 2012
recommendations apply to two groups: youth migrants in Almaty and rural youths planning to move to the cities.

Almaty

Net youth migration in Almaty remains positive with larger numbers moving to the city than leaving. As of 1 January 2012, young people accounted for 31.5% of the Almaty population. Almaty also has a lot of unregistered young migrants. More than half of survey respondents indicated that they were still registered at their former place of residence.

We believe that at this stage the policies attempting to return migrants to rural areas are bound to be non-productive. Programs aimed at addressing registration issues, creating new jobs and vocational training will be much more efficient.

The ILO recommends assisting young migrants at the community level by implementing city programs to improve access to services, housing, employment and professional training. Unfortunately, strategic programs launched by the Almaty Department of Employment and Social Programs and the Department on Youth Policies overlook youth migration issues.

The neglect of urgent issues, such as the lack of Almaty housing and jobs for young migrants, only exacerbates the social problems young migrants face and adds to the marginalization of this socially active group. The following recommendations have been made based on the results of our research:

To the Almaty local government

- Develop a registration system that would allow for an accurate assessment of the number of young migrant in Almaty and permit all young migrants to register with the regional akimats or departments for employment and social programs.
- Use the above registration data to ensure young migrants have access to social services and healthcare, including social assistance, child benefits and other payments, access to daycare, schools etc. according to the place of residence.
- Almaty Department of Statistics should provide reliable statistics on youth unemployment and the number of self-employed.
- Use the above statistics to develop a comprehensive city program to be implemented by all of the stakeholders to help young migrants resolve the issues identified in course of this research, including access to registration, housing, employment, childcare and others.
- Enter partnerships with universities and colleges to build enough residencies for higher education students to meet housing demand.
- Build affordable municipal houses for young migrant families without children.
- Develop and encourage the construction of youth-oriented residential compounds with all necessary infrastructures, including daycare, schools and out-patient clinics.
- Provide registered young migrants with land plots for housing construction that would provide an incentive for other migrants to register.
- Develop a municipal housing rent market.
- Report on the progress and results of the Youth Internship program in Almaty and publish the findings on the www.almaty.kz website, complete with financial statements and information about the number of permanent jobs that were created as a result of this program.
● Improve the Youth Internship program by focusing on the number of participants that succeed in finding permanent gainful employment rather than on the number of interns admitted to the program.

● Screen employers that apply to join the Youth Internship program and assess whether they are able to provide interns with permanent jobs after the internship is over.

● Encourage co-operation between public offices for employment and private employment agencies in developing a database of job vacancies. Motivate private agencies and district employment offices to create a single database of vacancies with daily online updates.

● Invite private employment agencies to participate in a city-funded tender on career-orientation services for young migrants, including basic skills assessment and selection of vacancies with a follow-up in the course of the year. Efficiency indicators should reflect the number of migrants that found employment rather than the number of those who received consultations.

● Invite colleges and vocational schools to take part in a tender to provide three- and six-month training for young migrants willing to accept jobs in professions where workers are in short supply, e.g. driver, accountant, chef, hairdresser and other.

● Provide financial incentives to motivate young migrants to learn new skills, including stipends, public transport passes, accommodation and meal plans.

● Training of migrants should include on-the-job training and coaching. Coaches should be motivated by financial bonuses linked to the success of trainees.

● The Regional Council on Youth Affairs should act as a supervisory body responsible for continuous monitoring of youth migrant programs in Almaty. The council should include members of city maslikhat, media, relevant city institutions, experts, NGOs and donor organizations. Council meetings should involve all the relevant organizations, including district employment departments, private employment agencies, vocational schools and colleges. Meetings should be held at least once a month. The detailed minutes of these meetings, including the agenda and relevant reports, should be published online.

To the Government

● Acknowledge the existence of child and youth inequality and recognize inequality as a major threat to the country’s future development.

● Give greater priority to investment in human capital when developing government policies.

● Take preventative measures against future youth problems by improving early childhood education and care, particularly for children from low-income families and disadvantaged backgrounds. To be fully effective, these measures need to be sustained throughout the period of compulsory schooling.

● Improve and simplify legislation governing the registration of internal migrants, allow them to register with district akimats or employment departments and guarantee them access to social programs in their place of residence in the cities. This reform will make it possible to calculate the exact numbers of internal migrants residing in the cities. The data can be used in the development of policies to help migrants adapt, the development
of infrastructure and social programs (access to childcare, child benefits, targeted social aid and other).

- Disclose and publish on the government websites (Ministry of Science, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Labor and Social Protection) detailed results of the 2009-2011 youth policy initiatives, such as Auyl Zhastary, With a Degree – to the Village!, Youth internship and other.

- Adjust the efficiency indicators for the Youth Internship program, to measure the success of the program on the basis of the number of permanent rather than temporary jobs created.

- Broaden the scope of the Youth Internship program to include two groups of young people: college and university graduates and occupational training graduates.

- Involve experts, including CSOs, donor and youth organizations, in the development of the Concept of State Youth Policy up to 2020. Include a section on youth migration in this document. Publicize the draft concept in the media and discuss the draft before adopting the Concept.

- Government should initiate the process of gathering suggestions and discussing ideas for a ‘comprehensive set of legislative and socio-economic measures for the building social lifts for young people’. For this purpose an ongoing online debate forum should be established on the Government’s website.

- Ensure that high-school students have access to career advice where they can learn about different professions.

- Restore the in-school vocational training system to give high-school students the skills in professions most needed on the local market (driver, tractor and combiner operators, accountant, chef, hairdresser and other), to ensure that high school graduates who do not enter college do not join the ranks of unemployed.

- Improve legislation in order to oblige local authorities to team up with universities/colleges and build higher education student residences to meet existing demand.

- Improve legislation and provide for the development of affordable municipal housing for young migrant families without children.

- Improve legislation and provide for the development of youth-oriented residential compounds with necessary infrastructure, including daycare, schools and out-patient clinics.

- Improve legislation and provide registered young migrants with plots for house construction.

**To the National Bank**

- Develop special financial services for low-income segments of the population with the aim of increasing their inclusion in the financial system.
In the course of reforming the pension system, address the inadequate coverage of migrants over 50 per cent of whom have no pension accounts and 80% have no pension savings.

**To civil society**
- Contribute to the understanding of child and youth inequality and call on the government and local authorities to focus attention on the most vulnerable groups of young people.
- Conduct further research and develop a knowledge base on youth issues.
- Take an active part in the development of the Concept of State Youth Policy until 2020.
- Initiate discussion of a ‘comprehensive set of legislative and socio-economic measures for building social lifts for young people’.
- Create information resource centers for young migrants in Almaty.
- Develop services for young migrants to help them adapt and integrate with society.
- Continuously monitor the Youth Internship program and other policy initiatives aimed at addressing youth and young migrants issues, organize the discussion and monitoring of results.
- Initiate multi-partite discussion of the options for the development of rural territories, the revival of rural areas and job creation; assess the potential and constraints of existing initiatives aimed at developing regions and villages, review the prospects for multi-stakeholder dialogue.

**To international organizations**
- Support ongoing research of internal migration patterns, youth unemployment and self-employment, youth involvement in small and medium sized business.
- Provide international case histories and action to address similar issues.
- Encourage improved co-operation between the government, youth organizations, academia, civil society organizations, private sector and the media with respect to supporting youth development.
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## Appendix

### Table 1. Net internal migration in 2000 – 2011

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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Agency for Statistics
Table 2. Correlation between the level of income and level of education of the respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly income</th>
<th>Incomplete 9 grades of high school</th>
<th>Completed 9 grades of high school</th>
<th>Incomplete high school</th>
<th>High school graduates</th>
<th>Incomplete vocational college</th>
<th>Vocational degree</th>
<th>Incomplete higher education</th>
<th>University degree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number %</td>
<td>Number %</td>
<td>Number %</td>
<td>Number %</td>
<td>Number %</td>
<td>Number %</td>
<td>Number %</td>
<td>Number %</td>
<td>Number %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>below 17,439 tenge</td>
<td>1 6.3%</td>
<td>4 1.5%</td>
<td>4 6.1%</td>
<td>2 1.8%</td>
<td>26 7.6%</td>
<td>2 1.1%</td>
<td>39 3.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17,459 - 25,000 tenge</td>
<td>3 18.8%</td>
<td>7 2.6%</td>
<td>14 21.2%</td>
<td>7 6.3%</td>
<td>57 16.6%</td>
<td>6 3.3%</td>
<td>94 9.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25,000 - 35,000 tenge</td>
<td>1 7.7%</td>
<td>2 12.5%</td>
<td>15 5.6%</td>
<td>12 18.2%</td>
<td>5 4.5%</td>
<td>64 18.7%</td>
<td>19 10.4%</td>
<td>118 11.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35,000 - 45,000 tenge</td>
<td>2 15.4%</td>
<td>4 25.0%</td>
<td>36 13.5%</td>
<td>8 12.1%</td>
<td>17 15.3%</td>
<td>65 19.0%</td>
<td>11 6.0%</td>
<td>143 14.3%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>45,000 - 55,000 tenge</td>
<td>6 46.2%</td>
<td>2 12.5%</td>
<td>66 24.8%</td>
<td>11 16.7%</td>
<td>20 18.0%</td>
<td>52 15.2%</td>
<td>20 11.0%</td>
<td>177 17.7%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>55,000 - 65,000 tenge</td>
<td>2 15.4%</td>
<td>2 12.5%</td>
<td>53 19.9%</td>
<td>8 12.1%</td>
<td>23 20.7%</td>
<td>32 9.3%</td>
<td>18 9.9%</td>
<td>138 13.8%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>65,000 - 75,000 tenge</td>
<td>2 66.7%</td>
<td>1 7.7%</td>
<td>1 6.3%</td>
<td>37 13.9%</td>
<td>2 3.0%</td>
<td>11 9.9%</td>
<td>11 3.2%</td>
<td>23 12.6%</td>
<td>88 8.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>75,000 - 85,000 tenge</td>
<td>1 33.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27 10.2%</td>
<td>1 1.5%</td>
<td>13 11.7%</td>
<td>15 4.4%</td>
<td>35 19.2%</td>
<td>92 9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85,000 - 95,000 tenge</td>
<td>1 6.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12 4.5%</td>
<td>1 1.5%</td>
<td>8 7.2%</td>
<td>8 2.3%</td>
<td>24 13.2%</td>
<td>54 5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95,000 - 200,000 tenge</td>
<td>1 7.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9 3.4%</td>
<td>5 7.6%</td>
<td>5 4.5%</td>
<td>13 3.8%</td>
<td>24 13.2%</td>
<td>57 5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>65 100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>